The Latest Ridiculous Acronym from the Army

From Tom Ricks' blog ...

"Here at Best Defense we've never really gotten into VUCA, an acronym apparently developed at the Army War College to describe the "Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous" environment that many think we will face in coming decades. It actually brought to mind a woman I dated in my senior year of college for a few crazy weeks. It was a learning experience, OK?

"But I think the acronym-makers missed a chance here. If they added "Lethal" in the middle and "Novel" at the end, then we could face a "VULCAN" challenge."

There's something else.  In addition to the general mindlessness that produces and uses so many acronyms (then wonders why the Army is so misunderstood), there is the continued abuse of the term "environment."  That's what VUCA is all about, the VUCA environment.

For more on the overuse and misuse of the term environment, see any Army doctrinal publication.

President Reagan and General Alexander on National Cyber Security

General Alexander

"In this present crisis," said President Ronald Reagan in his first inaugural address, "government is not the answer to our problem; government is the problem." Perhaps the former president's trenchant observation about the nation's economy is just as applicable to the present crisis in national cyber security.[1]

In a recent interview, General Keith Alexander, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command and Director, National Security Agency made an interesting observation. Speaking of the cyber threat to the nation, General Alexander noted that America’s adversaries “are aggressively stealing U.S. intellectual property [putting] the competitive edge of U.S. businesses at risk.” Putting it even more strongly, the general stressed that “the United States is on the losing side of the greatest transfer of wealth and treasure in history.”[2] That's the giant sucking sound you hear, unless you're completely deaf to these kinds of things.  It's happening right now as we speak.

Officers like General Alexander, and the rest of the Department of Defense in general, tend to take computer network security very seriously, apparently a lot more so than many other parts of the federal government.  The department’s emphasis on protecting our networks is keenly felt all the way down the chain of command. At Fort Gordon, for example, just this week, I and my teammates lost about 36 hours of productivity while information area security officers performed upgrades to our systems. Every year, everyone with computer access takes several hours of network security training. All of us maintain an up-to-date computer access cards, without which no access to the network is possible. Inspectors and security officers ensure that security regulations and policies are in place and closely followed. The list of security regulations, commanders' policies, training memoranda, agency updates, and "friendly reminders" are longer than a man's arm.

An awful lot of time and money are invested across the department to ensure that department employees, members of the uniformed services, and contractors know and follow all the rules. We do a pretty good job, I think, of protecting the data on our networks from ourselves—the good guys. When in the Sam Hill will the government start paying attention to people like General Alexander and get serious about protecting the nation’s data—it’s wealth and treasure—from the bad guys?

__________________________________
[1] Ronald Wilson Reagan, 1st Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C., The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=43130 (accessed 14 December 2012).
[2] Interview, General Keith B. Alexander, Military Information Technology, Vol. 16, #20, 16-19.

What is a Field Manual?

TRADOC Regulation 25-36

"A field manual is a Department of the Army publication that contains principles, tactics, procedures, and other doctrinal information. It describes how the Army and its organizations conduct operations and train for those operations. FMs describe how the Army executes operations described in the ADPs. They fully integrate and comply with the fundamental principles in the ADPs and the tactics and principles discussed in the ADRPs."  [Emphasis added.]

To say that, under Doctrine 2015, a field manual describes "what" and an Army Techniques Publication describes "how" is to put an entirely artificial construction upon doctrine.  It is also inconsistent with the regulation that governs doctrine.

Some helpful definitions.

Wally Aspires to be a Doctrine Writer?

Doctrine 2015's Effect on the Army Field Manual

The Doctrine 2015 framework is having an effect. That point is practically beyond dispute.  What is disputable is what, exactly that effect is.  The first thing to understand about Doctrine 2015 is that it is not about producing better doctrine. Instead, it's about revolutionizing the doctrinal publication development and dissemination paradigm.  Under Doctrine 2015, it's the process--not the product--that matters.

Mostly.

Evidence that the product is suffering may be found in talk that is common these days when the subject of the Doctrine 2015 hierarchy of publications comes up.  It is often said that field manuals are about "what" the Army does and ATPs (Army Techniques Publications) are about "how" the Army does what it does.

Which is nonsense.

Writing Signal Doctrine

Signal is a combat support function. But don’t take my word for it. Look it up in Field Manual 3-90 Tactics, published in 2001 but still valid. The intellectual center of the Army, however, has decreed that we may no longer use the term “combat support,” but that doesn’t change the idea that signal exists to support combat. If you are doctrine writer, even though you may be prevented by the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Leavenworth from describing signal as a combat support capability, you nevertheless must communicate to your target audience that signal’s entire thrust and meaning is to support the combat commander. 

As to specifically what this means, consider the following guidance from General Barry McCaffrey (U.S. Army Retired) to an infantry lieutenant about to deploy into a combat zone to lead an infantry platoon. 

“Some thoughts: 

• Hard work saves lives. Dig, camouflage, rehearse SOPs, study, plan, train between missions. 
• Never be surprised. ... OP/LPs ... 3-man point team ... OPSEC ... do aerial recon ... be quiet on the battlefield. 
• Safety, safety, safety ... getting soldiers killed or maimed by accident is very painful. 
• In contact either shoot, flank and attack, or shoot and withdraw. Always shoot ... get volume fire quickly on the enemy. Practice actions on contact before every mission. 
• The most important weapon on the battlefield is arty/mortars ... be prepared to put HE and smoke on possible enemy locations within three minutes. We rarely know where the fire is actually coming from ... arty will let you move without casualties on the battlefield.”[1]

As a signal doctrine writer, you’ve got to understand that McCaffrey’s words apply to the signal officer just as much as they do to the young infantry lieutenant. For the signal officer, at whatever tactical echelon, must configure his communications assets in such a way that all lieutenants can execute in accordance with the general’s guidance. General McCaffrey is directing an infantry combat leader. The signal officer is enabling that same combat leader. If the field manual doesn’t capture that dynamic, it fails as a doctrinal publication. 

Or, take this example. You are writing about signal support to operations at brigade level. You might chose a Stryker brigade combat team to illustrate this. A Stryker brigade has “more than 3500 Soldiers ... and almost 2000 vehicles, including more than 300 Strykers.”[2] In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (Stryker)—also known as the “Arrowhead Brigade,” was comprised of … 

“the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry; 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry; 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry; 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry; 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery; 296th Brigade Support Battalion; 334th Signal Company; 209th Military Intelligence Company; 13th Engineer Company; and Company C, 52nd Infantry (Antitank). Attached to it for the Iraq deployment are the 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), flying OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, and the 1092nd Combat Engineer Company from the West Virginia Army National Guard."[3]

Obviously, the Stryker brigade is supported by its own organic signal company, in the Arrowhead’s case by the 334th Signal Company. As the doctrine writer, you have to realize that just to say that an SBCT draws its signal support from an organic signal company is insufficient. In fact, it’s practically a waste of time because everybody already knows that. The point you have to get across to your target audience is that that signal company, with support from higher echelons where necessary, is supporting combat operations. The signal officer of a Stryker brigade supports infantry, armored cavalry, field artillery, logistical support, intelligence, engineers, and aircraft. You have to be aware that a unit like this particular SBCT may be augmented with Reserve or National Guard forces that may not be equipped, communications-wise, like their Regular Army brethren—but who still have to be supported. 

And think of signal support to large units like the 3rd Infantry Division which, during the “shock and awe phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, sprinted “720 kilometers in twenty-one days” while firing 610 direct support, ninety counter-fire, and twenty-six reinforcing artillery missions—13,923 155mm rounds and 794 multiple-launch rocket system missiles.[4] Think of how often the division's command posts moved.  Think of the factors of METT-TC.  Sure, it’s a true statement to say that divisions have an organic signal support capability, normally in the form a division signal company. But if that’s all you can say about signal support to division operations, you haven’t learned yet what doctrine is all about. 

Doctrine is “the blueprint for forces in combat.”[5] It is the “fundamental principles by which the military forces, or elements thereof, guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”[6]

Signal Soldiers are not just installing, operating, maintaining, and defending the Army’s portion of the network, they are supporting military operations—chief among them, combat. 

_________________________________

[1] Barry R. McCaffrey, “Lessons in Leadership: E-mail Exchange Between The Bradley Professor and an Infantry Lieutenant,” Army Magazine, June 2005, 16. 

[2] Dennis Steele, “The Stryker: Going Up North,” Army Magazine, March 2004, 44-54. 

[3] Ibid. 

[4] Thomas G. Torrence, “The Division Artillery of the 3rd Infantry Division,” Army Magazine, April 2004, 57-60. 

[5] Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), 253 

[6] Joint Publication 1-02.

Before Your Next Doctrine 2015 Briefing ...

10-page ADPs, 100-page ADRPs,
200-page FMs, ATPs with no size
limits, and Apps and Wikis.

                                     


          Imagine trying to explain this  >>>  

From left, Generals Bradley,
Eisenhower, and Patton

<<<  to these guys.

Dempsey vs. DePuy: The Impact of Two Generals on Army Doctrine

General DePuy

In the late 1970s, General William DePuy, as TRADOC commander (the first, incidentally), considered how he could improve Army doctrine. The Vietnam War had been recently concluded and the Army was wrestling with its lessons. From 1977 to 1981 there was "vigorous debate and rethinking of fundamental Army doctrine."[1] The outcome of all that thinking and debate—under General DePuy’s leadership—was the AirLand Battle Doctrine. 

In 2010, the TRADOC commander at the time, General Martin Dempsey (now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), considered how he might improve Army doctrine. Wars of long duration in Afghanistan and Iraq were drawing to a close and the Army was wrestling with more lessons learned. Similar to that earlier era, the closing years of this century’s first decade and the opening couple years of the next one have witnessed a vigorous debate and continuous rethinking of fundamental Army doctrine. The outcome of all that thinking—with General Dempsey’s guidance—is “Doctrine 2015.” 

General DePuy’s contribution was a fundamental shift in the Army’s blueprint for war fighting. In his day, the Army’s capstone war fighting doctrine was FM 11-5 Operations. That field manual no longer exists. 

General Dempsey

General Dempsey’s contribution to doctrine, so far, has been nearly half a decade of striving about words to no profit—full spectrum operations—combined arms maneuver and wide area security—co-creation of context—unified land operations—and a cosmetic reorganization of TRADOC’s doctrine library. Today, the Army’s capstone war fighting manual is Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 Unified Land Operations. The basic difference between what is essentially Dempsey’s FM 110-5 and DePuy’s version is that in today’s Army a capstone really isn’t a capstone. For ADP 3-0 cannot stand on its own; it requires the support of another document, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0 Unified Land Operations. 

There are other differences. FM 100-5 was developed with a definite potential enemy and probable area of operations in mind. ADP 3-0 (and its sister, ADRP 3-0) envisions a “complex operational environment.” AirLand Battle was about fighting. Unified Land Operations is about relationships. The former contained real doctrine, fundamental principles meant to guide Army forces or elements thereof in pursuit of the nation’s warfighting objectives. The latter is an annotated dictionary of operational terms and definitions with a fancy digital photo on its cover. 

From Washington to Grant to Pershing to DePuy to Dempsey, everyone in the Army has always understood what a field manual was. Today, despite two years of aggressive selling, it’s hard to find a Soldier who has a handle on what Doctrine 2015 is all about. 

On the subject of Army doctrine, the comparison between Generals DePuy and Dempsey boils down to this.  One general's overriding  concern was about what the manuals said. The other's is essentially about what they look like. 

________________________

[1] John J. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War (Fort Monroe, Virginia: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Military History Office, 1996), 16.

Some Thoughts on Doctrine 2015

Doctrine 2015 is about reorganizing the doctrinal publications process. It is not about producing better doctrine. 

During his tenure as the TRADOC commander, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey had the Army’s School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas study what could be done to improve Army doctrine. There was indeed considerable room for improvement. As the commander of TRADOC, the Army’s architect of the ‘Army of the future,’ General Dempsey served as the lead doctrine developer for the Army. He asked the smart folks at SAMS to come up with some recommendations on basically how to do two things—

• Make doctrine more accessible to Soldiers. 

• Get products to the field faster. 

Imagine John Kerry as SECDEF

From those who served with Kerry in Vietnam ...

Kerry as SECDEF?

There is talk that Massachusetts Democrat Senator John Kerry, who served in Vietnam, may be nominated to succeed fellow liberal Leon Panetta as the next Secretary of Defense.  What kind of defense secretary would John Kerry be?  Democrat Senator Zell Miller (D-Georgia) clued us in on that eight years ago in a stem-winder of a speech at the 2004 Republican National Convention. The "armed with spitballs" line is in the early part of Part II.

Part I Part II

On the Petraeus Thing

Not in any particular order, here are few accounts an opinions about what happened ...

A Fox News account by Jennifer Griffin and Adam Housely.

Jed Babbin's point of view.

Not a particularly bright piece by Tom Ricks.

The kind of article Ricks should have written, authored by Spencer Ackerman.

Amity Schlaes writes a great analysis of Petraeus, the man.  (Pity no one ever bothers to analyze the woman in cases like this).

Here's Don Imus' interview of author Vince Flynn, during which the whole Petraeus matter was discussed.



Since it came up in his interview of Vince Flynn, here is an Imus segment at which his reviews the Paula Broadwell interview.



And the latest from Fox News, via Bret Baier's Facebook page.

Petraeus taking the oath of office as the new
Director of Central Intelligence

Election 2012: Analyzing the Outcome

Andrew C. McCarthy

" ... The story is not about who voted; it is about who didn’t vote. In truth, millions of Americans have decided that Republicans are not a viable alternative because they are already too much like Democrats. They are Washington. With no hope that a Romney administration or more Republicans in Congress would change this sad state of affairs, these voters shrugged their shoulders and became non-voters."

Read more.

The Hardest School

Said Archidamus, the Spartan King (ca 432, B.C.), "a man who had a reputation for both intelligence and moderation ... 'There is no need to suppose that human beings differ very much one from another: but it is true that the ones who come out on top are the ones who have been trained in the hardest school.'"[1]

---

[1] Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by Rex Warner (London: Penguin Books, 1954), 82-85.

Favorite TV Shows of the Past: Mighty Mouse

Here I come to save the day!

Allen West and his Critics

Allen West, R-FL

So Allen West, Republican congressman from Florida’s 18^th District, wants to exercise his right to have a full hand recount of the votes in the wake of Tuesday’s disputed election result.  Here is how he framed the issue on his Facebook page—

“Our race is far from decided and there is no rush to declare an outcome. Ensuring a fair and accurate counting off all ballots is of the utmost importance. There are still tens of thousands of absentee ballots to be counted in Palm Beach County and potential provisional ballots across the district. Late last night Congressman West maintained a district wide lead of nearly 2000 votes until the St. Lucie County Supervisor of Elections “recounted” thousands of early ballots. Following that “recount” Congressman West trailed by 2,400 votes. In addition, there were numerous other disturbing irregularities reported at polls across St. Lucie County including the doors to polling places being locked when the polls closed in direct violation of Florida law, thereby preventing the public from witnessing the procedures used to tabulate results. The St. Lucie County Supervisor of Elections office clearly ignored proper rules and procedures, and the scene at the Supervisor’s office last night could only be described as complete chaos. Given the hostility and demonstrated incompetence of the St. Lucie County Supervisor of Elections, we believe it is critical that a full hand recount of the ballots take place in St. Lucie County. We will continue to fight to ensure every vote is counted properly and fairly, and accordingly we will pursue all legal means necessary.”

That opens the window a crack and lets us see some of what sort of things a conservative congressman has to put up with.  The wonders of social media, however, allow us to open that window much wider.  Here are some examples …

Leslie Stone, female, a resident of Royal Palm Beach, Florida (not a constituent of Mr. West), commented, “Did anyone really think West would leave graciously?”  I wonder if she had the same opinion of Al Gore’s request for a recount in his 2000 race against George W. Bush.

Tony Salvador, from just north of Palm Beach, writes, “NBC just called Murphy the winner. I am so happy you are out of office after only two years. You are a disgrace to the U.S House and to the United States Military. Fox news has a position for you right next to Sarah dumbass Palin.”  And he probably thinks Congressman West is the problem.

“At long last, congressman,” writes Joe Arthur of Dunedin, Florida, “have you no shame?”  Mr. Athur studied “edumacation at Ohio State University.”  At long last, he still appears to have no clue.

Kilt-wearing Hamish Mitchell, from who knows where, but who posts pictures of himself, one supposes, wearing a skirt, says, “Getting harder to sell Insane these days, ain't it, Allen?”  Methinks “Ms” Hamish should pay more attention to buying than to selling; for he has obviously purchases a bill of goods.

There’s no particular pattern to this.  I’m just picking idiots at random.  At this writing, West’s post has more than 2000 comments.  Not all of them, by any stretch, are kooks.  Some of the posts, one can tell, are by great Americans.  Still, the kooks are much more fun to blog about.

Jim Zimmerman, from Pittsburgh, of all places, sniffs, “Thank god you are gone you are a bigger asshole than Mitt....”  The Z-man studied “Elementary Ed at Slippery Rock University,” and once “worked at Masontown High School.”  He’s a fan of Bruce Springsteen and finds both Bill and Hillary Clinton inspirational.  That pretty much explains Jim’s manners.

Former Comfort Suites employee, Annie Cole Bullock Cox, from Alabama—and maybe that explains her—shouts, “All this shouting about the votes not being counted right in Fla, this is the same thing that happened in 2000 when we had to wait days to find out who really won the election. Do you people in Fla not know how to count. Give it up the election is over.”  Does she really think the candidates count their own votes? 

Then there is Kevin Singh—“ Hey Allen, since you were so obsessed with allowing insurance companies to deny medical coverage to persons like myself, will you be man enough to give up the taxpayer-funded Cadillac health insurance plan that all congressmen are entitled to and keep after they leave office? Since you're so much against government spending, why not set an example?”   Scintillating intellect, that Kevin.  On his Facebook page, under “About,” he has this blurb—“Reclusive. Live and work out of my home. Have two wonderful boys and a beautiful dog. I have what I need.”  Actually, he doesn’t.

The sad thing is that all these critics of West---not one of whom could score above Category IV on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery---are voters.  It's not the economy, stupid.  That was so twenty years ago.  These days, it's the stupids, stupid!

Rush Limbaugh is right.  It's not that the Republican Party has a "messaging problem,"  America has an idiocy problem.  We are outnumbered.  But this Allen West string is really much more fun if you following on his page.

The Day After

On the Eve of Election Day 2012

The Romney of my choice

Happy Birthday, Rebekah!

The Beekster and her little ones

It was on this day, a few decades back, that the Beek came into the world--via Texas, I might add.  Her first home was on the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.  Since then, she's lived on both sides of the United States and in two foreign countries.  Always been quite the traveler.  Now, she is the joyful mother of her own two little darlings.  And they like to travel, too, especially to Georgia to see their PaPa--which, I might also add, it's about time they did .... hint, hint.

Many happy returns to the Girleez!

On the Term ... “LandWarNet”

“LandWarNet” is essentially a generating force term and should not be used throughout a doctrinal publication to describe signal support to operations. No one in a theater of operations talks about “LandWarNet” — not the geographic combatant commander, not the theater army commander, not the J-staff, not the G-staff, not joint partners, not coalition partners, and certainly not Soldiers who use the network. The Army fights as an integrated member of the joint force. In a joint context, the term LandWarNet is totally meaningless. In Afghanistan, for example, when Soldiers talk about the network they are referring to the “Afghan Mission Network,” not LandWarNet. So the concept of LandWarNet is really irrelevant to operations within a theater of war or theater of operations where the operational Army is likely to be employed.

Moreover, LandWarNet is arguably not even a network (see note); it is simply the Army’s portion ($$) of the GIG. Neither the Army Capstone Concept nor any published joint or Army doctrine defines LandWarNet as a network. In simplest terms, LandWarNet is nothing more than the Army’s portion of the GIG, i.e., those portions of the GIG the life-cycle management costs of which are paid for with Army dollars. LandWarNet is therefore an acquisition term, not an operational term. It is a concern of the generating force, not the operational Army--and we write doctrine not for the former but for the latter. Therefore, the more and lengthier the tired discussions of LandWarNet, the less effective is any field manual that uses the term.

In nearly all instances, use of the term LandWarNet is also doctrinally inaccurate. Take NETOPS, for example. In a well-intentioned effort to draw a distinction between Army signal operations and those similar operations conducted by our sister Services, doctrine writers—in this current draft of FM 6-02—have invented the terms “GIG NETOPS” and “LandWarNet NETOPS.” Both terms are doctrinally incorrect; for Joint doctrine (JP 6-0) defines NETOPS as the activities performed in order to operate or defend the GIG. When signal soldiers perform NETOPS, they are, by definition, operating and defending the GIG, not “LandWarNet.”

So, use LandWarNet in JCIDS documents, where it makes sense, but not in doctrinal publications, where it doesn't.


Note.  ADP 6-0, within the context of describing networks (as components of a commanders' mission command system) makes a single reference to LandWarNet, calling it a "technical nNetwork."

Happy Birthday, Sarah!

Tiki Wiki

Today is the day, a quantity of years ago which shall not be divulged by this blogger, that the Little Sarahs came into the world.

Many happy returns!

Command Sergeant Major Basil L. Plumley (1 January 1920 -- 10 October 2012), United States Army: Garry Owen

CSM Plumley

Reflecting on the news of the recent passing of Command Sergeant Plumley, I pulled down my copy of We Were Soldiers and turned to the index. I found the entry for Plumley, Sgt. Maj. Basil L. and, sitting down, read each entry in the book that mentioned his name. Here are its first and last entries. 

“Before taking command, I [then Lt. Col. Hal Moore speaking; the year was 1965] had a long talk with the most important man in any battalion: the sergeant major. Basil L. Plumley, forty-four years old and a six-foot-two-inch bear of a man, hailed from West Virginia. The men sometimes called him Old Iron Jaw, but never in his hearing. 

“Plumley was a two-war man and wore master parachutist wings with five combat-jump stars. He was what the young Airborne types call a four-jump bastard: Plumley had survived all four combat jumps of the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II: Sicily and Salerno in 1943, and then in 1944, D-Day at Normandy, and Market-Garden in the Netherlands. For that matter, he also made one combat parachute jump in the Korean War, with the 187thAirborne Infantry Regiment. He ended World War II a buck sergeant and was promoted to sergeant major in 1961.  

“The sergeant major was a no-bullshit guy who believed, as I did, in tough training, tough discipline, and tough physical conditioning. To this day there are veterans of the battalion who are convinced that God may look likeSergeant Major Basil Plumley, but He isn’t nearly as tough as the sergeant Major on sins small or large. Privately, I thanked my lucky stars that I had inherited souch a treasure. I told Sergeant Major Plumley that he had unrestricted access to me at any time, on any subject he wished to raise.”[1]

*** 

“PLUMLEY, Basil, seventy-two [it does not seem like it, but the book was published twenty years ago], the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry’s sergeant major, retired from the Army as a command sergeant major on December 31, 1974, after thirty-two years, six months, and four days on active duty, and a second tour in Vietnam with the U.S. Advisory Group, Pleiku. His awards include the Combat Infantryman’s Badge with two stars; two Silver Stars; two Bronze Stars; four Purple Hearts; a Master Parachutist Badge with five combat-jump stars; a European Theater Service ribbon with eight campaign stars and four invasion arrows; a Korean Service ribbon with three campaign stars and one invasion arrow; a Vietnam Service ribbon with one silver and three bronze campaign stars; and the Presidential Unit Citation badge. He worked an additional fifteen years as a civilian employee at Martin Army Hospital at Fort Benning Georgia, and retired again in 990. He and his wife, Deurice, live in Columbus, Georgia, where he is president of the 1st Cavalry Division Association local chapter and an occasional quail hunter. Basil Plumley is a grandfather now, kind of soft-spolen, but do not be deceived: He is the lion in winter.”[2]

*** 

“CSM Plumley’s arrangements,” according to the Facebook page honoring retired Lt. Gen. Moore, are as follows. “Visitation is Monday from 10am to 8pm at Striffler Hamby on Macon Road in Columbus. The funeral service is on Tuesday at 1pm at the old Chapel at Fort Benning.”[3]

______________________________________

[1] Lt. Gen. Harold G. Moore (Ret.) and Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once … and Young: Ia Drang-the Battle that Changed the War in Vietnam (New York: Harper Perennial, 1992), 20. 

[2] Ibid., 424-425. 

[3] http://www.facebook.com/pages/Lt-Col-Hal-Moore/59545011275. 

Cheney on Cheney

Cheney

In some of the most self-reflective words ever spoken by the former Vice President, here is an excerpt from Dick Cheney’s May 27, 2006 commencement address at Natrona County High School in Wyoming.

Stay focused on the job you have, not the next job you might want.  In your careers, people will give you more responsibility when they see that you take your present job seriously.  Do the work in front of you.  Try to find ways to make yourself indispensable.  And I can almost guarantee that recognition, advancement, and other good things will follow.

I think there's also a lot of truth to the old wisdom that you should choose your friends carefully.  They have a big influence on the kind of person you become.  So when you see good qualities in people--things you admire, habits you’d like to pick up, principles you respect--keep those people close at hand in your life.  In many ways, when you choose your friends you choose your future. 

Source: Stephen F. Hayes, Cheney: The Untold Story of America's Most Powerful and Controversial Vice President (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007), 8-9.

Favorite TV Shows of the Past: Tarzan

One of my super heroes when I was growing up.

 

The Smirk and the Smackdown

The only thing wrong with this video is they put Romney on the left and Smirkface on the right.

President Romney's first act

In a sane world, 

one of President Romney's first acts 

would be to apologize ... 

to the world ... 

for the Obama Administration. 

Of course, in a sane world, 

there never would have been such a thing 

as an Obama Administration.

A Morning's Catch

Sally Ann's at Wrightsboro
and North Leg

My unplanned late start on the morning -- I always get a late start when I've got a lot to do, especially if it involves writing -- put me in the vicinity of the Wrightsboro Road Salvation Army store (Connie calls it "Sally Ann's") during its normal business hours.  So I dropped in with the idea of maybe finding a decent book or two.  

Walked out with five ...

Panzer Leader, by General Heinz Guderian (includes a Foreward by B. H. Liddel Hart).

First World War Prose, edited by Jon Glover and Jon Silkin

The Korean War: Pusan to Chosin, an Oral History, edited by Donald Knox.

Stillwell and the American Experience in China 1911-45, by Barbara Tuchman.

The Dilbert Future: Thriving on Stupidity in the 21st Century, by Scott Adams.

Total cost:  $9.22.  Not bad for a morning's catch. 

Who was "Gus" Pagonis?

Part of CENTCOM's area of responsibility

If the name "Gus" Pagonis doesn't ring a bell, you weren't paying attention during the Persian Gulf War.  Pagonis re-wrote the book on U.S. Army logistics during that conflict.

Just how important was logistics during the war? “In the year between August 1990 and August 1991—that is, before, during, and in the wake of the Gulf War—the logisticians of the U.S. Armed Forces in Southwest Asia, in an effort headed by the 22nd Support Command and the 1st and 2nd COSCOMs, planned, moved, and served 122 million meals.”[1] On the basis of just that fact alone, all soldiers would argue that logistics is very important. 

During that same year, while providing all those meals, those same logisticians “pumped more than 1.3 billion gallons of fuel” and drove in support of supply missions “almost 52 million miles” supplying everything from “tanks, planes, and ammunition” to sunscreen.[2] Soldiers, commanders, and everyone else involved in a war effort would surely stipulate that logistics is of the utmost importance in a campaign. 

CENTCOM devoted almost three full pages in its official executive summary of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm to logistics. The report covered such gigantic undertakings as— 

• Theater construction ... "$600M is critical construction projects were accomplished." 

• U.S. vs Host Nation contracting ... "food, fuel, water, transportation, facilities and accomodations" 

• Combat systems materiel readiness ... "operation readiness rates met or exceeded Service standards ... attributed to the Desert Express air line of communications, supply and support agreements with USEUCOM components, equipment reliability, and an exceptional level of effort from maintenance units." 

• Strategic airlift ... "augmentation of USTRANSCOM's organic lift capability by Civil Reserve Air Fleet ... our deployment air flow missions." 

• Army field feeding ... the plan for which is "based on two T-Ration hot meals and one MRE meal daily."[3]

All these things were accomplished by logisticians. 

Pagonis

Lieutenant William G. “Gus” Pagonis, as a two-star general, was the leader of those logisticians, some 40,000 of them, and the "head of the United States Army's 22nd Support Command."[4] General Schwarzkopf called him “the chief of logistics for the ground forces of Desert Shield.”[5] Pagonis was Lt. Gen. John J. Yeosock’s [the ARCENT/3rd Army commander] G-4 logistics officer. “Not only was he responsible for the logistics plan for Desert Storm,” according to Army Sustainment Magazine, “General Schwarzkopf also put him in charge of executing that plan on the ground.”[6] A significant contributing factor to his skill in managing such a huge logistical challenge like supplying the Gulf War was General Pagonis’ experience over previous years planning and executing logistics support of annual REFORGER exercises. 

Why did Pagonis become so famous? Aside from the fact that General Schwarzkopf described his work as “performing miracles,”[7] Pagonis’s fame was due in part, no doubt, because of his genuine approachableness. Affable, of Greek descent, “General Pagonis held daily press briefings during operations and conducted about 2,000 interviews.”[8] He seemingly was everywhere and he talked to everyone. Seldom was he seen without his red, loose-leaf binder. Said Pagonis— 

"During the Gulf War, I directed my planning team to compile a binder, known within the command as the Red Book, which was a complete and constantly updated collection of data outlining the developments of the conflict. Some four inches thick with charts and tables, it contained virtually all of the information I needed to keep abreast of our situation. While I was in transit from one theater location to another, that book was practically joined to me at the hip. General Schwarzkopf (or another general in the field or stateside) would frequently call me on the road or in the air with requests for specific information: how many tanks here, how much fuel there, how quickly can equipment be moved somewhere, and so on. I know that both my subordinates and superiors were regularly impressed with my almost magical grasp of the numbers. No magic was involved-I just studied the information in that binder every chance I could."[9]

His name became a household word as the Gulf War logistics story unfolded on nightly news broadcasts all around the world. 

General Pagonis has written that “the immediate military goal” of the Desert Shield buildup in the Saudi desert was “to discourage the Iraqi Army—which … included more than 100,000 troops in occupied Kuwait—from spilling over the border into Saudi Arabia.”[10] Therefore, the question must be asked, would the buildup have been dramatically different if Saddam had occupied Saudi Arabia? Such hypothetical “what if” questions have always been a part of military history, mainly because in and of themselves they can be quite interesting. One must be careful with hypotheticals, however, because conclusions drawn from them can skew the actual historical account and the solid lessons learned from that factual history. In the unlikely event that Saddam had invaded and occupied a portion of Saudi Arabia—say, the rich Eastern Province with its oil fields, industrial infrastructure, port facilities, and access to the Persian Gulf, the Desert Storm build up would obviously have been different. How different is difficult to say, because a number of possible courses of action present themselves. For example, the U.S. might have driven the Iraqis back over the border with air power. Force projection into the area might have had to utilize ports further away from the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations, Jedda on the Red Sea, or perhaps Bahrain or Qatar. An amphibious assault somewhere between the Kuwait-Saudi border might have interdicted Iraqi lines of communication and isolated Iraqi forces in and around Dammam, Dhahran, Khobar, and that general area—assuming that those locations would have been the aim of an Iraqi thrust into Kuwait. Whatever the situation, at the end of the day, a massive buildup of forces and capabilities would have to have occurred. Having to push Saddam out of Saudi, in addition to kicking him out of Kuwait, would have made the job more difficult, but certainly not impossible. 

______________________________

[1] William G. Pagonis, Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), 1. 

[2] Ibid., 2. 

[3] United States Central Command. “Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm: Executive Summary.” 11 July 1991, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39/document6.pdf (accessed 20 September 2012). 

[4] William G. Pagonis, "Leadership in a Combat Zone" Harvard Business Review 79, no. 11 (December 2001): 107-117. Business Source Elite, EBSCOhost (accessed September 21, 2012). 

[5] H. Norman Schwarzkopf, with Peter Petre, It Doesn’t Take a Hero: The Autobiography (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 341. 

[6] “Gulf War Logistics Records Donated to the Sustainment Community,” Army Sustainment, PB 700-10-05 Volume 42, Issue 5, September-October 2010, http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/SepOct10/

pagonis_logrecords.html (accessed 22 September 2012). 

[7] Schwarzkopf, 483. 

[8] Ibid. 

[9] Pagonis, “Leadership in a Combat Zone.” 

[10] Pagonis, Moving Mountains, 5

My Favorite Little Skypers

Papa and Gramma Pooch (in the computer screen) having a
Skype visit with Haydin (5) and Rory (2)

When you're a grandfather and your grandchildren live three time zones away, Skyping is the next best thing to being there.  This is us last night.  This conversation included some peek-a-boo with Rory, me trying to reach through the camera to steal their popsicles, and the little man showing off his Incredible Hulk tattoo.  All the while, Rebekah provides a running commentary in the background.

Desert Shield: Defence Against an Invasion that Never Came

Gulf War Commander
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf

From August 2, 1990 until January 1991 the coalition forces of Desert Shield were particularly vulnerable to an attack by Saddam toward Riyadh, but such an attack was never inevitable. Nevertheless, there is merit in examining the coalition’s vulnerabilities and how they might have handled such an attack. If the business of history is to understand, sometimes it may help to better understand what happened if one considers what did not happen, in spite of the circumstances, and why events did not play out according to prevailing expectations. 

First, it has generally been accepted that the Iraqi army, at the time of the Persian Gulf War, was the fourth largest army in the world and that, given its size, it must also have been one of the most powerful. The media made much about the size of the Iraqi army in the days immediately following its invasion of Kuwait when it began to become clear that the United States would send forces to the desert to face them. Much was also made of the fact that Saddam Hussein’s army, after its eight-year war with Iran, was a “battle hardened force—and that U.S. forces, by way of comparison, were not. Those reports, along with general media expertise on all things military, played to the fears of the American public, especially those families who might see—or already had seen—loved ones deploy to the region. Since little hard news reached troops in the desert, rumors flourished. Among the most believable of these was that the Iraqi army, having now tasted blood, would continue to march south and invade Saudi territory, probably its wealthy Eastern Province. It was a scenario made all the more believable, not just because it was such a distinct possibility, but also due to the fact that satellite imagery confirmed that eleven Iraqi divisions, mostly armored, were poised along Kuwait’s southern border. That data fed concerns at the highest levels. The sheer weight of numbers was overwhelmingly in favor of the Iraqis. U.S. forces had to come from seven thousand miles away. Even as they began to trickle in, and as Operation Desert Storm kicked into high gear, Iraqi forces maintained a numerical superiority. Their combat power potential was greater than the coalition’s until late September 1990, according to General Schwarzkopf in a postwar interview.[1] "To logical military minds,” wrote one retired major general, describing what many were absolutely certain of, “Saddam's best option seemed to be to continue the attack into Saudi Arabia to seize the airfields, ports, and oil fields [further down the north-south coastal highway]."[2]

If the Iraqi dictator had directed those eleven divisions—and over those initial weeks the number of Iraqi divisions in and around Kuwait steadily increased—to march into Saudi Arabia, what would have been his likeliest aim? Where was the coalition most vulnerable? 

Favorite TV Shows of the Past: Emergency!

We're on our way, Rampart!

 

Antietam Sesquicentennial

17 September 2012 marks 150 years since the Civil War Battle of Antietam.
For more information, check out these websites ...

http://www.nps.gov/anti
http://www.facebook.com/antietamnps
http://www.twitter.com/antietamnps1862
http://www.youtube.com/antietamnps
http://www.flickr.com/antietamnps

The Role of the 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, in the Operation Desert Shield

Question: 

When President Bush drew a line in the sand with the 82nd Airborne Division's deployment to the border between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, back in August 1990—some thought it a suicidal mission--what would have been the American reaction if Saddam destroyed the first Brigade to arrive in theater? Is that something Cheney and Schwarzkopf could have absorbed as leaders? 

Yours Truly Answers: 

The “line in the sand” was, in the president’s rhetoric, a warning to the Iraqi dictator not to do something he already was not going to do, that is, to invade Saudi Arabia. Still, to back up his words, the president dispatched the 82nd Airborne. 

The lead elements of the 82nd faced the early possibility of doing battle with eleven Iraqi Army divisions arrayed in Kuwait—“five armored; two mechanized; and four infantry. Of these, one armored and one mechanized were positioned opposite the Saudi border.”[1] This was an “insufficient” force with which to invade Saudi Arabia;[2] however, there was for a time a very real possibility that this force, or elements thereof, could have tangled with the first U.S. forces that arrived in theater. Those forces were indeed at significant risk, or so it was believed at the time. 

According to its Facebook page, the 2nd Brigade Combat
Team "Falcons" is the only organization in the US Army
to have served as a Light Infantry, Glider Infantry, and Parachute
Infantry Regiment.

The first U.S. ground forces to arrive in theater were the lead elements of the 82nd’s “division ready brigade,” or DRB, which happened to be the 2nd Airborne Infantry Brigade out of Fort Bragg. The first stick landed at Dhahran on 8 August 1990, seven days after the Iraqis invaded Kuwait, with the remainder deploying over the next four to five days. 

The 2nd Brigade’s mission was to “protect the airfield and ports American forces needed to deploy into Saudi Arabia.”[3] These facilities were located in and around Dhahran, an oil town on the eastern Saudi Arabian shore, close to Dammam’s port facilities and the village of Khobar, about 300 kilometers south of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. The headquarters of the Saudi ARAMCO oil company is in Dhahran. The U.S. Consolate serving “Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the Trucial States (Qatar, UAE and Oman)” also located there.[4]

As a DRB, 2nd Brigade was comprised of three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion equipped with 105mm Howitzers, a forward area support team composed of medical, supply and transport units from the Division Support Command, a combat engineer company, and armor company equipped with M551 “antiquated”[5] Sheridan armored reconnaissance vehicles, an air defense battery, and a communications platoon. When an infantry brigade assumed the DRB mission, so did its supporting units.”[6]

Left unsaid was the DRB’s other mission—