Doctrine for Signal Operations

Ostensibly, Field Manual 6-02 is about signal operations. But what does that mean? The question is not as simple as it appears. In the recently circulated author’s draft, there was a lot of describing of organizations—long stretches of descriptive content on theater signal commands, expeditionary signal battalions, network operations and security centers, G-6/S-6 staff sections, and so forth. Alongside this was considerable descriptive content on capabilities—the network, for example, communications security, information assurance, network transport, network services, network management, electromagnetic spectrum management, the list goes on. Sort of a waste of ink, not mention the reader’s time. For, if you picked up FM 6-02 in order to get a clearer idea on what signal operations are all about, you would have found about 200 pages of pedantic obfuscation. If you were looking for “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives,” [1] you wouldn’t have found any. In short, you would have been disappointed.  Indeed, many reviewers were.

I realize that a draft is a draft--and that you circulate a draft in order to solicit feedback and to gauge whether or not you're hitting the target.  And I realize that writing effective doctrine is a difficult endeavor.  That is why I offer this critique.

The central shortcomings, then, of the recently staffed author’s draft of FM 6-02 are two.  The first is the implication that, by its very title, the manual is all about signal operations, when at length one discovers that it is not. Second, and probably more aggravating, is that the manual purports to present doctrine. On both counts, the draft is a whiff. It misses the mark entirely. It leaves one with the impression (and you shake your head that at the U.S. Army Signal Center of Excellence this is even possible) that its authors (a) don’t understand what doctrine is, and (b) don’t know what signal operations are either.

So, how to fix it.

A good first stab would be to define the term “signal operations.” I find it very interesting—and telling—that in no Army or joint doctrinal publication is the word “operation,” or “operations” defined. This is significant. There is a keystone joint publication (JP 3-0) about “joint operations,” that does not define “operations.” There is an Army doctrine publication (ADP 3-0) and an accompanying Army doctrine reference publication (ADRP 3-0) that do not define “operations.” Look them up. While you’re at it, consult JP 1-02 and FM 1-02, the joint and Army dictionaries. You won’t find the term “operation” defined. This Army and joint failing hinders writers of signal operations doctrine from effectively defining what it is that the Signal Regiment does for the Army. Proof of this is that anemic author’s draft recently reviewed.

Update: The term "operation," is in fact defined. Don't know how I missed it.  JP 3-0 says that an operation is either "a series of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme" or "a military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission."

One cannot think of signal operations apart from Army operations—or joint operations. That is, the narrower context of signal operations informs the broader context of what the Army as an integrated member of the joint force is doing. So far, FM 6-02 fails at establishing this connection. Instead, it wastes time trying to describe “the operational environment.” It throws around current buzz words like unified land operations, but doesn’t get down to the essence of the who, what, where, when, how, and why that underpins this operational concept. It spends page after page offering details, but never gets down to fundamental precepts.  And therein lies the rub.

Update:  This fault is not unique to FM 6-02; it is a common shortcoming in all doctrinal publications.

If you are going to describe signal operations in a doctrinal publications it is imperative that you make the connection between the discipline of signal operations and role, mission, and functions of the Army and, by extension, the joint force. You have to show that the former is an enabler of the latter. You have to put  the role, mission, and functions of the Signal Regiment in subjugation to combined arms maneuver and wide area security in the context of how the Army operates. You have to describe what is going on in the Army at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war and—correspondingly—what signal operations is doing that enables that activity. The current draft has chapters that purport to do this, but they just don’t get it done. Not even close. In the chapter on signal support at the strategic level, for example, the reader suffers through a tedious pass in review of signal capabilities within tactical organizations!

You have to show the dynamic nature of operations. You have to connect this dynamism to the warfighting functions. You have to show how signal operations enable all users of the network—but especially operational commanders—to form a common operational picture. You have to show how signal operations enable the processing of information that builds this common operational picture. You have to show how this common operational picture informs decision making at all levels, how it helps commanders to “see,” to “visualize,” and to “understand” what is happening. You have to relate this to the military decision making process and to the operational process. You have to show how the sensory data transported and processed by the network enables the execution of missions, tasks, and activities that support national strategy. You have to show how the services provided by the network make the Army better at performing its mission.  If you don’t do this you’re not writing doctrine.

You have to write in terms of signal operations being a technological enabler or facilitator of the rapid movement of information and data—in the context of Army and joint operations. You have to make the connection between this activity and the chief warfighting function of mission command. Then you have to relate signal operations-enabled mission command to the intelligence warfighting function—and here you begin to build the framework of the common operational picture that is essential to effective decision making and effective mission command. You have to then make the connection between signal operations-enabled mission command and intelligence to the other warfighting functions—to movement and maneuver, to fires, to sustainment, and sustainment.

You have to write this in terms of fundamental principles. For example, you have to demonstrate that signal operations is all about commanders—not the “6,” not the radio guy, not the computer operators, or the technicians, or some vague entity known as "LandWarNet."  Effective signal operations are commander-centric. That is a fundamental. Everything about signal operations is driven by a commander’s critical information requirements—no matter what echelon, or which level of war, you’re writing about. In terms of fundamentals, you would also have to write about—

• The influence of the information environment upon the operational environment—and the corresponding influence upon the former of signal operations. 
• That significant domain within the information environment known as “cyberspace”—and the relationship between signal operations and what we call “cyberspace operations.” 
• Signal operations always playing a supporting role to other operations. 
• The roles and responsibilities of Signal Soldiers and how they train in order to conduct signal operations. 
• The unique capabilities of signal equipment and how these capabilities influence operations. 
• The relationship of all of the above to the Army’s ability to fulfill its obligations to the nation. 

If you do not write about these things you are not writing about signal operations—and you most certainly are not writing signal operations doctrine. The Army doesn’t need a description of the network. It needs doctrine on how the network supports or enables Army (and joint) operations. The Army doesn’t need a signal flavored description of its corps, its divisions, its brigades, or its many units. It doesn’t even need a description of the organizations within the force that serve uniquely signal functions. It needs doctrine on how these organizations support or enable the generating force and the operational Army. The Army doesn’t need a refresher on the impact of modularity. It needs fundamental principles (in this case, signal-specific principles) that will guide it in support of national objectives. It needs an authoritative statement from the Signal Regiment on what it is we do for the Army in the context of the larger picture of Army and joint operations.

The Army just needs signal doctrine. That’s all FM 6-02 should provide.

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[1] JP 1-02.