Paulus at Stalingrad

Paulus

The question is sometimes asked, in reference to the German defeat at Stalingrad, was Nazi General Friedrich Paulus the right man for the job; could someone else have pulled off a defense or a breakout?

Paulus enters the story relatively late and some historians have labeled him a “question mark,” noting his success in a string of staff assignments, but also that he had never held an operational command.[1] A telling indication of his abilities is in the apparent concern of his peers about his “disposition,” and that this, along with his lack of command experience could be problematic for Sixth Army, “under Hitler’s thumb” as it was.[2] His competency, at first at least, appears to be beyond question as Soviet forces retreated before his army on the southwest front as operation BLAU got underway. The question seems to be, as General Bock was then warning[3]—before being fired—was whether this was due to the general success of the operation, or whether the new Soviet tactic of trading space for time merely gave German commanders the illusion of success when, in reality, danger loomed.

My assumption is that Paulus was working from a position of some disadvantage, in a strategic sense, owing to Hitler’s fuzzy thinking relative to the campaign’s operational objectives. He seems to have been given the Stalingrad mission late in the game as well as suddenly—for that is how the situation is described, that “suddenly, on 19 July, Hitler reoriented the offensive from the Caucasus to Stalingrad.”[4] Moreover, he was provided “relatively weak” reinforcements and was, like everyone else, blind to the reality of Soviet defenses in and around the city.[5] All of this would naturally have had a corrosive effect on his own operational planning. To this may be added the observation that, while the Germans seemed more oriented towards conquering territory, the Soviets were actually, by this time, focused on destroying the Wehrmacht and, with it, Germany’s war fighting capability. Indeed, this was the central objective of the two major operations, URANUS and MARS, unleashed in September.[6]

Though these twin operations were launched in late summer, “heavy fighting since May had burned out much of Sixth Army.”[7] Sent into battle with insufficient resources, Paulus had thus over time been further weakened. The situation in November—when Hitler absented himself for several days from direct operational command, during which absence the Soviets launched a vicious attack that—only worsened the situation. But it was here that Paulus’ “disposition” began to manifest itself. One imagines the frantic scene at Army Group B headquarters as they flashed orders to Sixth Army and watched its left flank collapse. Paulus, however, “merely waited on events” and seemed to leave major decision-making up to his chief of staff, who advised Army Group B headquarters that the only remedy for the situation was resupply by air.[8]

By the time Hitler returned, the situation was irretrievable. General Zeitzler, who was now commanding Army Group B, argued with the Fuehrer that Paulus be authorized to retreat, but he was overruled. Hitler never could grasp that sometimes an advantage could be gained by yielding territory. He insisted that Paulus must hold out.

At this point, Goering entered the picture and assured Hitler that the Luftwaffe could supply Sixth Army by air. And so the decision was made. Even so, Hitler brought Manstein in to organize a breakthrough to relieve Sixth Army. At the decisive point of that operation, Manstein “urged both Hitler and Paulus to order … [a] breakout. But Hitler refused;” and Paulus, his “disposition” again manifesting itself, “was unwilling to disobey Hitler’s instructions.”[9]

Any other competent commander—Rommel and Manstein come first to mind—would have had to operate under the “malignant influence”[10] of Hitler. Rommel, as it happened, was up to his neck in North Africa and was not available. Manstein was in theater, but he was pulled in much too late to have had any decent chance at retrieving the situation. Given the circumstances, even if either one of these two clearly more capable field marshals had been given command of Sixth Army at the outset of BLAU, it is doubtful even they could have pulled off a successful breakout from Stalingrad. The only difference might have been that the force of their personalities—Rommel’s especially, backed by their superior competence, might have influenced Hitler’s decision-making in a way that Paulus never could. Put either one of them in Paulus’ place and the situation as it developed in Stalingrad may have never eroded to the degree that it did. One imagines that a successful breakout could then have been effected.


_____________________________
[1] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2000), 279.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid., 280.
[4] Ibid., 281.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid., 284.
[7] Ibid., 286.
[8] Ibid., 287.
[9] Ibid., 289.
[10] Ibid., 281.