Kasserine Pass

Kasserine Pass, Tunisia, North Africa

It was the most inauspicious of starts for the eventual victor of World War II.

The Allied defeat at Kasserine pass was marked by “fundamental flaws in doctrine, command, and organization.”  That is, the forces under Eisenhower’s command at the time, British units possibly excepted, were in no wise prepared for war.  They lacked soundness in understanding fundamental principles that should have guided them in their execution of operations necessary to carry out national objectives.  They lacked fitness in their commanders, especially the type of fitness for command that is developed either in battle or through tough, realistic training.  They were not optimally organized—especially at echelons above brigade—for coalition warfare in an austere environment at the forward end of supply lines that stretched across the Atlantic Ocean, into the Mediterranean, and extended half-way across the northern shores of Africa.

In its doctrine, the Americans had not determined how best to employ their National Guard units.  Throwing in a mix of NG units with the 34^th Infantry Division, they put a force on the field that was “ignorant of field manuals, unable to reconnoiter properly, and generally deficient in basic and small-unit training.  Many … arrived in Tunisia not knowing how to use the weapons they were supplied (notably bazookas and mines), how to secure their flanks, procedures for identifying friend and foe, or how to fight at night.”  Budiansky  notes that, given their performance at Kasserine, apparently “the book on tank doctrine [had been] thrown out the window.” [1]

A component of its deficient doctrine was American ignorance of how to form itself in mechanized warfare.  Compounding its overall weakness as a fighting force, its commanders sent armored units into the fight piecemeal instead of massing them.  The result was that these units were destroyed in detail.  Though this mistake was corrected and never made again during the war, it was a disaster for the Allied side at Kasserine.

Eisenhower

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the theater commander, had been promoted by General Marshall above many who actually outranked him.  He had never before commanded forces in combat and his inexperience showed.  Nevertheless, he is to be credited for assessing the Kasserine fiasco for what it was and making appropriate changes—quickly.  He relieved Brigadier General Raymond McQuillin and replaced the overcautious General Lloyd R. Fredendall his opposite type, Major General George S. Patton as II Corps' commander.  Though Budiansky doesn’t mention it, Omar Bradley was also tapped by Eisenhower to assume higher command in the wake of Kasserine.

That such an overwhelming defeat did not spell doom for the Allied effort in the overall war was owed much to the German inability to capitalize on its victory.  There was considerable disorganization within the German high command.  Rommel was never reinforced to the extent necessary to maintain any advantage in the North African theater.  Moreover, he was weakened by illness and had to evacuate himself from the theater shortly after the battle in order to seek proper treatment.  Without his leadership, the Axis war machine sputtered.

The failure of the Nazis to take full advantage of their victory at Kasserine gave the Allies what they so desperately needed—time to learn from their mistakes and to make those changes in doctrine, organization, and leadership that were essential to the success the Allied forces would obtain as the war waxed on.

The Germans failed to exploit their victory because they were essentially beaten--in the North African theater. That, I think, is the intent of the article, that in spite of having the tar kicked out of them, the Allies had actually turned a corner at Kasserine. Some of that is 20/20 hindsight, but some is legit. The Germans' morale was ebbing. Berlin was ignoring Rommel's requests for reinforcements and was giving him much less than he was asking for in terms of supplies. Rommel, himself was not in good health. All these negatives were a drag upon German leadership. At Kasserine, they were like an athletic team that had pushed itself beyond its limits with a lot of time still left on the clock. And time was what the Allies used to their advantage.

Notes.

1.  Stephen Budiansky , “Triumph at Kasserine Pass,” Historynet.com (March 30, 2011), http://
www.historynet.com/triumph-at-kasserine-pass.htm (accessed November 20, 2011).