Why General Dwight Eisenhower was not Relieved After the Debacle at Kasserine Pass

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

On the face of it, the sacking of General Dwight D. Eisenhower in the wake of the stunning Allied defeat at Kasserine Pass seemed certain, but he was not relieved. Though a strong case could have been made for his immediate dismissal, the issue of whether he should stay or go was never raised. Cooler heads prevailed. Career-wise, the man who would go on to earn five stars and become the nation’s 34th president lived to fight another day.

It is customary when armies are routed upon the field of battle that their commanders—assuming their failure to obtain the honor of their death in combat—are fired, sacked, relieved, replaced. Already in World War II the Army and Navy had seen this custom followed. Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel and General Walter Short, both commanders in the Pacific, had been forced into retirement, as a consequence of their failures related to the Japanese surprise attack upon the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. The chief of naval operations, Admiral Harold Stark had for the very same reasons been denied a theater command. The debacle for U.S. and British forces at Kasserine Pass and the subsequent maintenance of its responsible commander, General Eisenhower as theater commander represents an interesting deviation from this custom. After Kasserine, Eisenhower would rise, Phoenix-like, to become the Supreme Allied Commander, earn a fifth star, and later become president of the United States.

“The disaster at Kasserine Pass was Eisenhower's first test in the reality of being commander-in-chief [theater commander, as it would be described today]. Up until this battle, the reality of his [own and his subordinate] commanders' actual abilities in war situations was unknown.”[1] The humiliating defeat, coming as it did more than fifteen months after Pearl Harbor, coupled with the almost zero significant Allied progress made against the Axis powers elsewhere, could only have had the effect of further eroding the confidence and the expectations of the American and British peoples, to say nothing of the same for their political and higher-level military leaders.

At the time of Pearl Harbor, barely fifteen months back, Eisenhower had been a newly promoted brigadier general. Prior to the North African campaign, he had been a staff officer to Generals Douglas MacArthur and George Marshall, the Army chief of staff, but he had never seen combat. Yet in June of 1942, less than six months after becoming a general officer, Marshall recommended to President Roosevelt that Eisenhower be named the top commander in the European theater of operations. His first actual fighting, however, took place in North Africa. The invasion of the African continent, termed Operation TORCH, began rather inauspiciously, with costly victories at Rabat, Oran, and Algiers, along the Mediterranean coastline of North Africa. Then, eight months after the commencement of the operation, just as Eisenhower’s forces appeared to be gaining a little steam, they were all but wiped out at Kasserine Pass.

Ike, as General Eisenhower was known throughout the Army, “had made his reputation as a staff officer under Generals George Van Horn Mosel and [Douglas] MacArthur … working long hours.”[2] He had served as an assistant to MacArthur when MacArthur ran the Philippines and later when MacArthur, himself had been the Army chief of staff. General Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, had chosen Eisenhower, in the wake of Pearl Harbor, precisely because of that experience and because it was well known in the Army that Eisenhower was an officer who wasn’t afraid to accept responsibility. Though he had never commanded in combat, and was a bit of a late bloomer,[3] Marshall considered Eisenhower to be like a deputy commander and not just another staff officer. This is one reason why Eisenhower was chosen as supreme commander of Allied operations in the European theater. Probably more than any other officer in the Army at that time, Ike enjoyed Marshall’s full and complete confidence.

The battle at Kasserine Pass tested General Marshall’s confidence in Eisenhower, his protégé. In the end, Eisenhower’s performance under fire was also a measure of Marshall’s ability to lead the Army as its senior officer. That he took no action to remove General Eisenhower from command may have been his single greatest contribution to the Allied effort of winning the Second World War.


Facts about the Battle of Kasserine Pass.
The Allied invasion of the North African coast was code named Operation TORCH. Operation TORCH was primarily a defensive operation “designed to limit German exploitation in Africa and to relieve the situation in the Mediterranean.” Its broader purposes were to “deny North Africa to the Axis, protect sea communications in the South Atlantic, and provide direct support to the Middle East.”[4]

As events played out, the war in North Africa served as the training ground for major combat operations on the European continent. What started as “skirmishes between platoons and companies involving at most a few hundred men, metastasized to battles between army groups comprising hundreds of thousands of soldiers,” as author Rick Atkinson put it. “North Africa gave the European war its immense canvas and implied—through 70,000 Allied killed, wounded, and missing—the casualties to come.”[5]

If the battles at Kasserine Pass were General Eisenhower’s first major combat test as a theater commander, it was a test he failed miserably. “In terms of territory lost,” wrote one historian, “the 85-mile retreat forced on the men over the course of the week-long battle was the worst shellacking of the war.”[6] Kasserine Pass, actually a series of battles fought over four days in February, 1943 between Allied forces, under Eisenhower, and German forces, under Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, was a German counteroffensive against the steady march eastward, toward the Tunisian peninsula, of coalition forces led by Eisenhower.

“American losses exceeded 6,000 of the 30,000 men engaged in the battle. Of those, half were missing.” “[Major General Lloyd R.] Fredenhall’s corps lost 183 tanks, 104 half-tracks, more than 200 guns, and 500 jeeps and trucks.”[7]

Even years later, the taste of defeat lingered. "It pains me to reflect on that disaster,” said Omar Bradley. “It was probably the worst performance of U.S. Army troops in their whole proud history."[8]


Grounds for Relieving Eisenhower of his Command.
Eisenhower violated long-standing principles of war. His convoluted command structure violated the cardinal principle of unified command. In author Rick Atkinson’s opinion, “possibly, one would have to search all history to find a more jumbled command structure than that of the Allies in this operation.”[9] The most disadvantageous aspect of Eisenhower’s command was his placement of the U.S. II Corps, commanded by Fredenhall and was the unit that saw most of the fighting, under Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson’s British First Army. It was a difficult setup for passing orders down and receiving accurate situation reports.

Compounding his error in not setting up a unified command structure, Eisenhower committed a most basic error in failing to lead from the front. “In theory, writes another historian, Eisenhower had full control of the Allied forces in the area [of Kasserine Pass]. However, he based himself in Algiers, 400 miles away from the fight. To compensate, Eisenhower appointed Major General Lucien Truscott Jr. to be his representative in the area [of operations] but Truscott based himself in Constantine, 200 miles from the frontline. Actual day-to-day command fell to Lieutenant-General Sir Kenneth Anderson, commander of the 1st British Army.”[10] Thus, Allied forces suffered from a lack of senior leadership with an up-close knowledge of the battlefield.

“If your subordinates cannot do the work for you,” Marshall had counseled the young general, “you haven’t organized them properly.”[11] Throughout the North African campaign, there had been instances where it was evident that Ike had not organized his commanders properly. This was particularly so at Kasserine Pass. Though some of his commanders proved themselves indeed to be incompetent, their failures also reflected a certain amount of incompetence in Eisenhower, himself. Whether this incompetence stemmed from his lack of experience or from a lack of abilities and character was something that General Marshall and President Roosevelt had to constantly reassess.

In training, it had been Eisenhower’s practice to visit units in the field as much as possible. At Kasserine Pass, however, this practice did not seem to have carried over into actual combat operations. In England during the build-up, Ike made a point to visit his division commanders during field training exercises to take each unit’s pulse. This was “almost an obsession” with him, according to one general officer. Ike wrote to this officer about the “certainty with which you can judge a division, or any other large unit, merely by knowing its commander intimately.”[12] Had this been his modus operandi in Tunisia, he might have learned of the inadequateness of certain of his division commanders—Fredenhall in particular—and thus might have made changes to his command structure in time to avoid defeat.

Because he did not lead from the front, Eisenhower placed too much reliance upon signals intelligence, namely the top secret intercepts and decryption of coded German radio communications known as ULTRA. This mistake could also be viewed in reverse. Because he relied too much upon signals intelligence, that is, upon ULTRA, General Eisenhower perhaps felt justified in not moving his command post closer to the area of operations. Much of the intelligence gained from ULTRA intercepts was not corroborated by normal intelligence gathering capabilities on the ground. Hence, Allied commanders did not always see a clear picture.

A further justification for the dismissal of General Eisenhower over his performance at Kasserine Pass was the heavy psychological impact the defeat had upon the Nation. "The event was incredible,” wrote historian Martin Blumenson. “It shook the foundations of [our] faith, extinguished the glowing excitement that anticipated quick victory, and, worst of all, raised doubt that the righteous necessarily triumphed."[13]

Taken cumulatively or considered separately, these facts demanded action. If that action did not manifest itself in the immediate sacking of the theater commander, then the grounds for retaining his services had to have been stronger. Consider now the grounds for retaining Eisenhower in command.


Grounds for Retaining Eisenhower in Command.
The only officer who could have relieved Eisenhower was Marshall, the Army chief of staff. However, for a man of principle such as General Marshall to have fired General Eisenhower would have required him to go against a principle he himself had laid down—to Eisenhower, in fact—earlier in the war. Marshall expected his officers to take charge and solve their own problems. “The department,” he told a young Brigadier General Eisenhower, “is filled with able men who analyze their problems well but feel compelled always to bring them to me for final solution. I must have assistants who will solve their own problems and tell me later what they have done.”[14] Arguably, that is exactly what Eisenhower did at Kasserine Pass and Marshall could therefore not fault him for doing so.

The president also could have relieved Eisenhower, but he did not. As commander in chief, President Roosevelt could have relieved any officer. Indeed, he withheld promotions, at one point telling Marshall that he expected to see some accomplishments before he authorized higher rank for anyone. One restraint upon his taking punitive action against his theater commander may have been that he considered himself partly to blame for Eisenhower’s slow start in his command. As David Eisenhower put it, “during the stalemate in central Tunisia in the winter of 1943 [FDR] had held up Eisenhower’s promotion to four stars, so that for several months he was outranked by his entire array of British AFHQ deputies.”[15] This presidential dithering probably contributed to the convoluted command structure under which the Allies were forced to fight at Kasserine. It may also have undermined the confidence Eisenhower needed from the other coalition members’ general staffs.

Finally there is the question of who would have taken his place had Eisenhower actually been relieved. MacArthur was committed to the Pacific. Jonathan Wainwright was a prisoner of war. Mark Clark was part of the Kasserine problem. It is true that George Patton and Omar Bradley moved up in rank and stature in the wake of Kasserine, but both were too junior to make the leap to commander of European operations, the position held by Eisenhower. Perhaps Marshall could have assumed command himself, but that would have left open the position of chief of staff, thus only rearranging the problem, not solving it. Besides, it is likely that FDR had already become so dependent upon Marshall’s military and political judgment (as he voiced later, when naming Eisenhower to command Operation OVERLORD, the Allied invasion of France), saying that Marshall could not be spared.[16]

To surmise that a dismissal of General Eisenhower would have been the remedy to the Allies’ problems at Kasserine would have been to fundamentally misunderstand what the allies problems were. Failures of leadership were only a part of the issues bedeviling Allied operations. The main ones were logistical and strategic. Eisenhower’s lines of communications reached from North Africa across the Atlantic to the continental U.S. Supplies moved to the front very slowly. Moreover, after slightly more than a year at war, the ‘arsenal of democracy,’ as FDR called America’s industrial might, had not yet reached full production. The whole strategic problem involved questions of why the U.S. had involved itself in an extended land campaign on African continent to start with. These issues had been debated for months and were still not fully answered to the satisfaction of all. Looking back, however, it was clear that North Africa was a place where American forces went to fight, get their noses bloodied, make mistakes, and learn. Lessons learned there, especially at Kasserine Pass, proved invaluable as the war moved later to Italy, to Europe, and in the Pacific theater.


Conclusion
Dismissing General Eisenhower from command because of the defeat at Kasserine Pass was never actually considered. A battle was lost there in the hills of Tunisia, but not a war. It was a tactical loss, not a strategic reversal. Still, it hurt to lose and the losses were great. The losses—of men and materiel, of blood and treasure—would continue to mount as operations moved across North Africa, into Sicily and Italy, and ultimately onto the northern European continent. Yet the tide was turning. By the time of this battle in February, 1943, the Axis powers no longer had the initiative. The initiative now belonged to the Allies. They, and not the Axis, determined where and when they would engage. The Allies were on the offensive and had pushed the Axis over to the defensive. The war making power of the Germans was past its apex, but the American ‘arsenal of democracy’ was just kicking into high gear. Thus, time was on the Allies’ side. At Kasserine, the veteran German army held the local numerical advantage. As Stephen Ambrose described it, “an American defeat was almost inevitable.” The tactical problem faced by Eisenhower’s divisions at Kasserine Pass was not the main issue, however. “The real problem, before and during the battle, was whether or not the Americans could prevent a tactical defeat from turning into a strategic disaster. In this they succeeded.”[17] In that light then, why would the president, his Army chief of staff, or even the combined chiefs of staff of the Allied countries consider sacking their victorious theater commander?

---

[1] Kenneth W. Rendell, “Dwight D. Eisenhower,” http://www.historical-autographs.com/full-description.aspx?
ItemID=20403610&title=DWIGHT+D+EISENHOWER (accessed December 2, 2011). 

[2] David Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War 1943-1945 (New York: Random House, 1986), 57.                                                                                                                              

[3] Ed Cray, General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman (New York: Norton and Co., 1990), 263.

[4] Stephen F. Ambrose, The Supreme Commander: The War Years of Dwight D. Eisenhower (Mississippi: University Press, 1970), 74.

[5] Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943 (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2002), 3.

[6] Joel, “Defeat and Victory at Kasserine Pass,” Today’s History Lesson (February 19, 2011), http://todayshistory
lesson.wordpress.com/2011/02/19/defeat-and-victory-at-kasserine-pass/ (accessed December 2, 2011). 

[7] Atkinson, 389.

[8] Stephen Budiansky, “Triumph at Kasserine Pass” Historynet.com (March 30, 2011) http://www.historynet.com/
triumph-at-kasserine-pass.htm (accessed December 24, 2011).

[9] Atkinson, 390-391.

[10] Author unknown, “Kasserine,” History Learning Site, http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/kasserine_pass.htm (accessed December 2, 2011).

[11] Eisenhower, 38.

[12] Atkinson, 62. 

[13] Budiansky.

[14] Atkinson, 6.

[15] Eisenhower, 3.

[16] Cray, 417.

[17] Ambrose

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ambrose, Stephen F.  The Supreme Commander: The War Years of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Mississippi: University Press, 1970.

Atkinson, Rick.  An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943.  New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2002.

Author Unknown. “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq.  Brookings Institute (30 November 2011).  http://www.brookings.edu/~/media
/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index.pdf (accessed December 17, 2011).

Author Unknown. “Kasserine.” History Learning Site.  http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk
/kasserine_pass.htm (accessed December 2, 2011).

Budiansky, Stephen.  “Triumph at Kasserine Pass.” Historynet.com (March 30, 2011).  http://
www.historynet.com/triumph-at-kasserine-pass.htm (accessed December 24, 2011).

Cray,Ed. General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman. New York: Norton and Co., 1990.

Eisenhower, David.  Eisenhower at War 1943-1945.  New York: Random House, 1986.                                                                                                                              

Joel.  “Defeat and Victory at Kasserine Pass.”  Today’s History Lesson (February 19, 2011). http://todayshistorylesson.wordpress.com/2011/02/19/defeat-and-victory-at-kasserine-pass/ (accessed December 2, 2011). 

Rendell, Kenneth W. “Dwight D. Eisenhower.” http://www.historical-autographs.com/full-description.aspx?ItemID=20403610&title=DWIGHT+D+EISENHOWER (accessed December 2, 2011). 

, 166.