Ike on U.S. Strategy in Europe in the Second World War

Speaking as General Eisenhower on the U.S. military strategy in Europe in World War II ---

General Eisenhower

The first problem we were faced with in World War II, once we were officially in the war, was that it was a war in two widely separated theaters.  We were fighting both in Europe and in the Pacific.  Obviously, would could not fight in both places equally well at the same time.  We settled, however, almost immediately upon a “Europe-first” strategy, devoting the preponderance of our efforts in that theater while trying to use our remaining resources in such a way as to gain time and prevent further decay of our situation in the Pacific.

However, before we would really establish ourselves in the European theater, there was the problem of mobilizing a fighting force and figuring out where best to insert that force into the fight.  Working with our British allies, who shortly after our entry into the war felt themselves unready to embark upon a cross channel invasion of the continent straight into the enemies teeth, we worked out a way —operation TORCH — to help them push the Germans out of French and British territorial possessions on the continent of North Africa.  This required amphibious landings in Morocco and Algiers and a linking up with our British allies in Tunisia and a vast pincer movement against Rommel’s forces.  The operation took much longer and was far more costly than we would have liked, but it gave us tremendous battlefield experience and helped us reset our corps- and division-level leadership prior to undertaking further operations against the European mainland.

High-level strategy meetings led by the president, Mr. Churchill, and the combined chiefs of staff, first at Casablanca then at Tehran, helped us shape our planning for the opening of a second front against the Germans—the first front being the Russian’s push-back against Hitler’s push for lebensraum in the east in abrogation of his treaty of non-aggression with Stalin.  Due to difficulties in assembling sufficient shipping in order to stage a cross-channel invasion, our second front operations were limited to a continuance of our Mediterranean operations—by striking first against Sicily followed by a long slog up the Italian peninsula—and by continued day and night strategic bombing of select targets in northern and central Europe, hoping to dent some of the Wehrmacht’s war-making capabilities.  What we had hoped to begin in 1943 simply could not be started until the following year.

After reviewing a range of possibilities for further operations against Europe, we finally settled upon a cross-channel invasion of Northern France to take place in the summer of 1944.  After the Tehran conference, the president chose me as the Supreme Allied Commander of this invasion and the subsequent drive toward the heart of Germany.  We assembled practically every division we could upon English soil and conducted what limited training our space and logistical situations allowed for.  We developed and extensive and quite complicated campaign of military deception in order to confuse the German army as to our precise intent.  We knew they had the capability to hurl us back into the Channel had they know exactly when and where we planned to strike.

D-Day for the invasion was June 6, 1944.  We met stiff resistance but were able to gain a lodgment and begin moving troops inland.  I gave responsibility for the northern thrust to General Montgomery and the southern thrust to General Patton.  For a time, maybe a month, we made tremendous progress, liberating Paris and commencing our drive to the Rhine.  At the same time, we landed more troops in southern France who were able to join us for the drive eastward toward Berlin.  We also met with some success in our Italian campaign.  However, in mid-December, the Germans pushed back hard in what became known as the Battle of the Bulge.  It was called that because their Field Marshall Von Rundstedt nearly split our front near Bastogne.  But though our forces bent, they did not break.  Our counterattack repulsed their forces and we were able, by late January, to push on.

From there, it was a race to Berlin to link up with our Russian allies.  I sent sent Montgomery into the German industrial heartland known as the Ruhr region.  After a setback in our operation MARKET-GARDEN, we were able to achieve many of our objectives, gaining port facilities at Antwerp to relieve some of the supply burden we were under.  Our rapid progress consumed many thousands of gallons of gasoline per day, for example, and drawing our supplies from the beaches of Normandy and from the French port of Cherbourg was simply insufficient.  Slowly, but surely, we advance upon Berlin and, as events turned out, our adversary quit first, taking his own life.  Victory in Europe was ours by May 7, 1945.