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| Bomber Harris |
The Allies’ gaining of air superiority, in each of the major theaters of the war, essentially determined the conflict’s outcome in that theater. Superiority in the air meant two things. First, it meant that the Allies could capitalize on their vast advantage in terms of strategic bombing. Second, because of their advantage in strategic bombing capabilities, they soon achieved significant advantages in terms of battlefield maneuver. Superiority in the air enabled the Allies to mass firepower against the enemy in two domains, on land and from the air. Allied air superiority meant that the enemy was restricted to fighting only, or mainly, in the land domain.
Virtually ever since the invention of the airplane, aviators have believed that wars could be decided by air power alone. Even today there are many who subscribe to this view, despite much evidence to the contrary, but the opinion was much more widely held during World War II, when air power was just coming into its own. In America, the name of Billy Mitchell attaches itself to many of the early theories touching upon the effectiveness of air power. Essentially, what Mitchell espoused as early as the 1920s was set forth in a concept written by Sir Charles Webster and Dr. Noble Frankland, entitled The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany part of which was cited in B. H. Liddel-Hart’s history of the Second World War—
“The strategic air offensive is a means of direct attack on the enemy state with the object of depriving it of the means or will to continue the war. It may, in itself, be the instrument of victory or it may be the means by which victory can be won by other forces. It differs from all previous kinds of armed attack in that it alone can be brought to bear immediately, directly, and destructively against the heartland of the enemy Its sphere of activity is, therefore, not only above, but also beyond that of armies or navies.”
Against Germany. “The Army Air Forces (together with Britain’s Bomber Command) blasted German cities into rubble using mainly B-24 and B-17 heavy bomber aircraft, but the war in Europe ended only when Allied armies occupied Germany’s territory.”[1] Strategic bombing—by itself—was never the ‘be all, end all’ solution to the essential military problem of the war, which was to destroy the warfighting capabilities of the Axis nations.
“By the summer of 1943, the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe were increasingly well armed. The German industrial sector … was expanding at a massive rate despite the bombing of Germany by the Allies. In 1942, Germany produced 5,700 medium and heavy tanks. In 1943, this had increased to 11,900. The production of planes had doubled between the two years; ammunition production had increased three-fold by 1943.”[2] [Emphasis added]
Part of the reason for this extremely poor rate of return on the Allies’ investment in strategic bombing was their slowness to realize that “command of the air is the prime prerequisite to an effective strategic bombing offensive.”[3] By the time of the Normandy Campaign, however, this was a lesson that had been learned, and no less of a personage than Field Marshall Erwin Rommel paid tribute to it. “Our operations in Normandy are hampered, and in some places even rendered impossible,” he wrote—
“by … the immensely powerful, at times overwhelming, superiority of the enemy air force. As I and officers of my staff have repeatedly experienced … the enemy has total command of the air over the battle area up to a point some 60 miles behind the front. During the day, practically our entire traffic—on roads, tracks, and in open country—is pinned down by powerful fighter-bomber formations, with the result that the movement of our troops on the battlefield is almost completely paralyzed, while the enemy can maneuver freely. Every traffic defile in the rear areas is under continual attack and it is very difficult to get essential supplies of ammunition and petrol up to the troops.”[4]
In Rommel’s description of what was happening to his Army Group B in Northern France, one sees what was happening to the entire German Reich and its ability to wage war as the conflict progressed—
“Even the movement of minor formations on the battlefield—artillery going into position, tanks forming up, etc.—is instantly attacked from the air with devastating effect. During the day, fighting troops and headquarters alike are forced to seek cover in 2ooded and close country in order to escape the continual pounding from the air. On the 9th of June, the situation in the battle area behind the SS Corps, was that large numbers of enemy fighter-bomber squadrons circled the battlefield continuously, while powerful bomber formations dropped a very heavy weight of bombs on troops, villages, bridges, and crossroads, with complete disregard for the civilian population. Neither our anti-aircraft nor the Luftwaffe seems capable of imposing any check on the paralyzing and destructive effect of the enemy air force.”[5]
Against Japan. The operational effectiveness of the American strategic air offensive against Japan before about October 1944 was minimal. Until the Americans captured Saipan and the rest of the Marianas in the summer of 1944, strategic bombing runs against Japanese targets had to start from China or India. This put the Japanese mainland outside the maximum effective range of the B-29 and was too costly. Besides, these bombing runs “did little damage … and required so much of the air supply … to maintain … for results so poor, that [the B-29s in China] were withdrawn early in 1945.”[6] Even after securing air bases on Saipan, the effects of General LeMay’s “daylight precision-bombing” of the Japanese mainland “were disappointing.”[7]
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| LeMay |
But between October 1944 and March 1945 things changed. “The number of B-29s in the Marianas was trebled”[8] and LeMay altered his tactics. LeMay’s changes included switching to night time raids at lower altitudes. This lessened the strain on his aircraft’s engines and allowed the planes to carry a larger payload. Importantly, he also added incendiary explosives. The change in tactics gave him the capability of destroying dozens of square miles at a time and was markedly effective in terms of bringing the citizens’ morale. Between 9 and 19 March 1945, LeMay’s air forces dropped 10,000 tons of incendiary bombs on the cities of Tokyo, Osaka, Kobe, and Nagoya. “In July the tonnage was three times” more than in March and “the effects were tremendous … Civilian morale declined badly … over 8.5 million people fled the cities into the countryside—causing war production to sag.”[9]
Some statistics indicate the magnitude of the offensive’s impact upon Japan’s ability to wage war. Japan’s oil-refining industry “declined by 83 per cent” … aircraft engine production “by 75 per cent … airframes by 60 per cent … electronics equipment by 70 per cent … More than 600 major war factories had been destroyed or badly damaged.” Over and above the cost in materiel damage, moreover, was the effect all this destruction had on the civilian populace. The bombing campaign after the spring of 1945 “brought home to the Japan’s people that their forces could no longer protect them, and that surrender, even unconditional, had become unavoidable.”[10]
Like all other aspects of war, strategic bombing, before it could be operationally effective, was a skill that had to be learned. Someone, like Webster Frankland, had to construct the operational concept, and someone else, like Billy Mitchell, had to perform the operational experimentation to refine it. But then there is nothing like the operational laboratory of war to perfect certain ideas and practices and this is what happened in World War II with respect to strategic bombing. Clearly, as skill and understanding were gained and combined with their growing superiority in the air, the impact and importance of the Allies’ strategic bombing campaign against both major adversaries in war restricted their individual ability to fight back. Like a boa constrictor, it slowly but inexorably suffocated their offensive capabilities. The strategic air initiative was the first and most prominent place where the Allies’ industrial and materiel superiority began to tell, and, operationally, it was the deciding factor in the war.
[1] John Whiteclay Chambers, II,
Ed., The Oxford Companion to American
Military History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 18.
[2] The Battle of Kursk, History
Learning Site, http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/battle_of_kursk.htm (accessed 26 July 2012).
[3] B. H. Liddel-Hart, History of the Second World War (Old
Saybrook, Connecticut: Konecky and Konecky,1970), 591.
[4] B. H. Liddel-Hart, Ed., The Rommel Papers (New York: De Capo
Press, 1953), 476-477.
[5] Ibid.
[6] B. H. Liddel-Hart, History of
the Second World War (Old Saybrook, Connecticut: Konecky and Konecky,1970),
690.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid., 691.
[10] Ibid.
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