Hitler's Strategy by Late 1943

Hitler and the Nazi symbol

As 1944 dawned, Hitler faced this problem: that a successful Soviet offensive in the east would probably cost him the Ukraine and Belorussia—potential areas of German lebensraum, but space that was not essential to the Reich’s existence. A successful U.S.-British invasion in the west, however, could well cost him the Rhine-Ruhr region—the life’s blood of his Army. The former areas were expendable, but not the latter. Therefore, by all means possible, Germany must prevent the western Allies from gaining a foothold on the continent. The Axis’ central problem, therefore, was for the Wehrmacht to throw the invaders back into the sea. The Wehrmacht certainly tried to accomplish this, but obviously failed. Hence the decisiveness of D-Day.

Allied establishment of a second front in Western Europe would spell certain doom for the Third Reich. Hitler knew this. He also knew, as 1944 approached, that an Allied invasion from England was imminent, which is why he sent Rommel to northern France. The Reich’s strategic aim, given that it must soon fight on two fronts, east and west, was “the defeat of one enemy so that all resources could be concentrated against the other and a stalemate achieved.”[1]

The invasion, therefore, must be stopped in its tracks. As early as March 1942, as he withdrew his Luftwaffe from the battle over the skies of Britain, Hitler’s concept of the situation in the west was that “Atlantic coast defenses should be so organized and troops so deployed that any invasion attempt would be smashed before landing or immediately thereafter.”[2] 

On this point, Rommel and Hitler agreed.  “The main battle line,” he said,” must be the beach.”[3]

So at the beginning of 1944, Hitler faced this problem: a successful Soviet offensive in the east would probably cost him the Ukraine and Belorussia—potential German lebensraum, but not essential to the Reich’s existence. A successful U.S.-British invasion in the west could well cost him his Rhine-Ruhr region—the life’s blood of his Army. The former areas were expendable, but not the latter. Therefore, by all means possible, Germany must prevent the western Allies from gaining a foothold on the continent. The Axis’ central problem, therefore, was for the Wehrmacht to throw the invaders back into the sea.

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[1] David Fraser, Knight’s Cross: A Life of Field Marshall Erwin Rommel (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 453.

[2] Stephen E. Ambrose, D-Day June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 36.

[3] Fraser, 455.