Doctrine 2015's Effect on the Army Field Manual

The Doctrine 2015 framework is having an effect. That point is practically beyond dispute.  What is disputable is what, exactly that effect is.  The first thing to understand about Doctrine 2015 is that it is not about producing better doctrine. Instead, it's about revolutionizing the doctrinal publication development and dissemination paradigm.  Under Doctrine 2015, it's the process--not the product--that matters.

Mostly.

Evidence that the product is suffering may be found in talk that is common these days when the subject of the Doctrine 2015 hierarchy of publications comes up.  It is often said that field manuals are about "what" the Army does and ATPs (Army Techniques Publications) are about "how" the Army does what it does.

Which is nonsense.

Writing Signal Doctrine

Signal is a combat support function. But don’t take my word for it. Look it up in Field Manual 3-90 Tactics, published in 2001 but still valid. The intellectual center of the Army, however, has decreed that we may no longer use the term “combat support,” but that doesn’t change the idea that signal exists to support combat. If you are doctrine writer, even though you may be prevented by the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Leavenworth from describing signal as a combat support capability, you nevertheless must communicate to your target audience that signal’s entire thrust and meaning is to support the combat commander. 

As to specifically what this means, consider the following guidance from General Barry McCaffrey (U.S. Army Retired) to an infantry lieutenant about to deploy into a combat zone to lead an infantry platoon. 

“Some thoughts: 

• Hard work saves lives. Dig, camouflage, rehearse SOPs, study, plan, train between missions. 
• Never be surprised. ... OP/LPs ... 3-man point team ... OPSEC ... do aerial recon ... be quiet on the battlefield. 
• Safety, safety, safety ... getting soldiers killed or maimed by accident is very painful. 
• In contact either shoot, flank and attack, or shoot and withdraw. Always shoot ... get volume fire quickly on the enemy. Practice actions on contact before every mission. 
• The most important weapon on the battlefield is arty/mortars ... be prepared to put HE and smoke on possible enemy locations within three minutes. We rarely know where the fire is actually coming from ... arty will let you move without casualties on the battlefield.”[1]

As a signal doctrine writer, you’ve got to understand that McCaffrey’s words apply to the signal officer just as much as they do to the young infantry lieutenant. For the signal officer, at whatever tactical echelon, must configure his communications assets in such a way that all lieutenants can execute in accordance with the general’s guidance. General McCaffrey is directing an infantry combat leader. The signal officer is enabling that same combat leader. If the field manual doesn’t capture that dynamic, it fails as a doctrinal publication. 

Or, take this example. You are writing about signal support to operations at brigade level. You might chose a Stryker brigade combat team to illustrate this. A Stryker brigade has “more than 3500 Soldiers ... and almost 2000 vehicles, including more than 300 Strykers.”[2] In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (Stryker)—also known as the “Arrowhead Brigade,” was comprised of … 

“the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry; 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry; 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry; 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry; 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery; 296th Brigade Support Battalion; 334th Signal Company; 209th Military Intelligence Company; 13th Engineer Company; and Company C, 52nd Infantry (Antitank). Attached to it for the Iraq deployment are the 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), flying OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, and the 1092nd Combat Engineer Company from the West Virginia Army National Guard."[3]

Obviously, the Stryker brigade is supported by its own organic signal company, in the Arrowhead’s case by the 334th Signal Company. As the doctrine writer, you have to realize that just to say that an SBCT draws its signal support from an organic signal company is insufficient. In fact, it’s practically a waste of time because everybody already knows that. The point you have to get across to your target audience is that that signal company, with support from higher echelons where necessary, is supporting combat operations. The signal officer of a Stryker brigade supports infantry, armored cavalry, field artillery, logistical support, intelligence, engineers, and aircraft. You have to be aware that a unit like this particular SBCT may be augmented with Reserve or National Guard forces that may not be equipped, communications-wise, like their Regular Army brethren—but who still have to be supported. 

And think of signal support to large units like the 3rd Infantry Division which, during the “shock and awe phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, sprinted “720 kilometers in twenty-one days” while firing 610 direct support, ninety counter-fire, and twenty-six reinforcing artillery missions—13,923 155mm rounds and 794 multiple-launch rocket system missiles.[4] Think of how often the division's command posts moved.  Think of the factors of METT-TC.  Sure, it’s a true statement to say that divisions have an organic signal support capability, normally in the form a division signal company. But if that’s all you can say about signal support to division operations, you haven’t learned yet what doctrine is all about. 

Doctrine is “the blueprint for forces in combat.”[5] It is the “fundamental principles by which the military forces, or elements thereof, guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”[6]

Signal Soldiers are not just installing, operating, maintaining, and defending the Army’s portion of the network, they are supporting military operations—chief among them, combat. 

_________________________________

[1] Barry R. McCaffrey, “Lessons in Leadership: E-mail Exchange Between The Bradley Professor and an Infantry Lieutenant,” Army Magazine, June 2005, 16. 

[2] Dennis Steele, “The Stryker: Going Up North,” Army Magazine, March 2004, 44-54. 

[3] Ibid. 

[4] Thomas G. Torrence, “The Division Artillery of the 3rd Infantry Division,” Army Magazine, April 2004, 57-60. 

[5] Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), 253 

[6] Joint Publication 1-02.

Before Your Next Doctrine 2015 Briefing ...

10-page ADPs, 100-page ADRPs,
200-page FMs, ATPs with no size
limits, and Apps and Wikis.

                                     


          Imagine trying to explain this  >>>  

From left, Generals Bradley,
Eisenhower, and Patton

<<<  to these guys.

Dempsey vs. DePuy: The Impact of Two Generals on Army Doctrine

General DePuy

In the late 1970s, General William DePuy, as TRADOC commander (the first, incidentally), considered how he could improve Army doctrine. The Vietnam War had been recently concluded and the Army was wrestling with its lessons. From 1977 to 1981 there was "vigorous debate and rethinking of fundamental Army doctrine."[1] The outcome of all that thinking and debate—under General DePuy’s leadership—was the AirLand Battle Doctrine. 

In 2010, the TRADOC commander at the time, General Martin Dempsey (now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), considered how he might improve Army doctrine. Wars of long duration in Afghanistan and Iraq were drawing to a close and the Army was wrestling with more lessons learned. Similar to that earlier era, the closing years of this century’s first decade and the opening couple years of the next one have witnessed a vigorous debate and continuous rethinking of fundamental Army doctrine. The outcome of all that thinking—with General Dempsey’s guidance—is “Doctrine 2015.” 

General DePuy’s contribution was a fundamental shift in the Army’s blueprint for war fighting. In his day, the Army’s capstone war fighting doctrine was FM 11-5 Operations. That field manual no longer exists. 

General Dempsey

General Dempsey’s contribution to doctrine, so far, has been nearly half a decade of striving about words to no profit—full spectrum operations—combined arms maneuver and wide area security—co-creation of context—unified land operations—and a cosmetic reorganization of TRADOC’s doctrine library. Today, the Army’s capstone war fighting manual is Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 Unified Land Operations. The basic difference between what is essentially Dempsey’s FM 110-5 and DePuy’s version is that in today’s Army a capstone really isn’t a capstone. For ADP 3-0 cannot stand on its own; it requires the support of another document, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0 Unified Land Operations. 

There are other differences. FM 100-5 was developed with a definite potential enemy and probable area of operations in mind. ADP 3-0 (and its sister, ADRP 3-0) envisions a “complex operational environment.” AirLand Battle was about fighting. Unified Land Operations is about relationships. The former contained real doctrine, fundamental principles meant to guide Army forces or elements thereof in pursuit of the nation’s warfighting objectives. The latter is an annotated dictionary of operational terms and definitions with a fancy digital photo on its cover. 

From Washington to Grant to Pershing to DePuy to Dempsey, everyone in the Army has always understood what a field manual was. Today, despite two years of aggressive selling, it’s hard to find a Soldier who has a handle on what Doctrine 2015 is all about. 

On the subject of Army doctrine, the comparison between Generals DePuy and Dempsey boils down to this.  One general's overriding  concern was about what the manuals said. The other's is essentially about what they look like. 

________________________

[1] John J. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War (Fort Monroe, Virginia: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Military History Office, 1996), 16.

Some Thoughts on Doctrine 2015

Doctrine 2015 is about reorganizing the doctrinal publications process. It is not about producing better doctrine. 

During his tenure as the TRADOC commander, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey had the Army’s School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas study what could be done to improve Army doctrine. There was indeed considerable room for improvement. As the commander of TRADOC, the Army’s architect of the ‘Army of the future,’ General Dempsey served as the lead doctrine developer for the Army. He asked the smart folks at SAMS to come up with some recommendations on basically how to do two things—

• Make doctrine more accessible to Soldiers. 

• Get products to the field faster. 

Imagine John Kerry as SECDEF

From those who served with Kerry in Vietnam ...

Kerry as SECDEF?

There is talk that Massachusetts Democrat Senator John Kerry, who served in Vietnam, may be nominated to succeed fellow liberal Leon Panetta as the next Secretary of Defense.  What kind of defense secretary would John Kerry be?  Democrat Senator Zell Miller (D-Georgia) clued us in on that eight years ago in a stem-winder of a speech at the 2004 Republican National Convention. The "armed with spitballs" line is in the early part of Part II.

Part I Part II

On the Petraeus Thing

Not in any particular order, here are few accounts an opinions about what happened ...

A Fox News account by Jennifer Griffin and Adam Housely.

Jed Babbin's point of view.

Not a particularly bright piece by Tom Ricks.

The kind of article Ricks should have written, authored by Spencer Ackerman.

Amity Schlaes writes a great analysis of Petraeus, the man.  (Pity no one ever bothers to analyze the woman in cases like this).

Here's Don Imus' interview of author Vince Flynn, during which the whole Petraeus matter was discussed.



Since it came up in his interview of Vince Flynn, here is an Imus segment at which his reviews the Paula Broadwell interview.



And the latest from Fox News, via Bret Baier's Facebook page.

Petraeus taking the oath of office as the new
Director of Central Intelligence

Election 2012: Analyzing the Outcome

Andrew C. McCarthy

" ... The story is not about who voted; it is about who didn’t vote. In truth, millions of Americans have decided that Republicans are not a viable alternative because they are already too much like Democrats. They are Washington. With no hope that a Romney administration or more Republicans in Congress would change this sad state of affairs, these voters shrugged their shoulders and became non-voters."

Read more.

The Hardest School

Said Archidamus, the Spartan King (ca 432, B.C.), "a man who had a reputation for both intelligence and moderation ... 'There is no need to suppose that human beings differ very much one from another: but it is true that the ones who come out on top are the ones who have been trained in the hardest school.'"[1]

---

[1] Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by Rex Warner (London: Penguin Books, 1954), 82-85.

Favorite TV Shows of the Past: Mighty Mouse

Here I come to save the day!

Allen West and his Critics

Allen West, R-FL

So Allen West, Republican congressman from Florida’s 18^th District, wants to exercise his right to have a full hand recount of the votes in the wake of Tuesday’s disputed election result.  Here is how he framed the issue on his Facebook page—

“Our race is far from decided and there is no rush to declare an outcome. Ensuring a fair and accurate counting off all ballots is of the utmost importance. There are still tens of thousands of absentee ballots to be counted in Palm Beach County and potential provisional ballots across the district. Late last night Congressman West maintained a district wide lead of nearly 2000 votes until the St. Lucie County Supervisor of Elections “recounted” thousands of early ballots. Following that “recount” Congressman West trailed by 2,400 votes. In addition, there were numerous other disturbing irregularities reported at polls across St. Lucie County including the doors to polling places being locked when the polls closed in direct violation of Florida law, thereby preventing the public from witnessing the procedures used to tabulate results. The St. Lucie County Supervisor of Elections office clearly ignored proper rules and procedures, and the scene at the Supervisor’s office last night could only be described as complete chaos. Given the hostility and demonstrated incompetence of the St. Lucie County Supervisor of Elections, we believe it is critical that a full hand recount of the ballots take place in St. Lucie County. We will continue to fight to ensure every vote is counted properly and fairly, and accordingly we will pursue all legal means necessary.”

That opens the window a crack and lets us see some of what sort of things a conservative congressman has to put up with.  The wonders of social media, however, allow us to open that window much wider.  Here are some examples …

Leslie Stone, female, a resident of Royal Palm Beach, Florida (not a constituent of Mr. West), commented, “Did anyone really think West would leave graciously?”  I wonder if she had the same opinion of Al Gore’s request for a recount in his 2000 race against George W. Bush.

Tony Salvador, from just north of Palm Beach, writes, “NBC just called Murphy the winner. I am so happy you are out of office after only two years. You are a disgrace to the U.S House and to the United States Military. Fox news has a position for you right next to Sarah dumbass Palin.”  And he probably thinks Congressman West is the problem.

“At long last, congressman,” writes Joe Arthur of Dunedin, Florida, “have you no shame?”  Mr. Athur studied “edumacation at Ohio State University.”  At long last, he still appears to have no clue.

Kilt-wearing Hamish Mitchell, from who knows where, but who posts pictures of himself, one supposes, wearing a skirt, says, “Getting harder to sell Insane these days, ain't it, Allen?”  Methinks “Ms” Hamish should pay more attention to buying than to selling; for he has obviously purchases a bill of goods.

There’s no particular pattern to this.  I’m just picking idiots at random.  At this writing, West’s post has more than 2000 comments.  Not all of them, by any stretch, are kooks.  Some of the posts, one can tell, are by great Americans.  Still, the kooks are much more fun to blog about.

Jim Zimmerman, from Pittsburgh, of all places, sniffs, “Thank god you are gone you are a bigger asshole than Mitt....”  The Z-man studied “Elementary Ed at Slippery Rock University,” and once “worked at Masontown High School.”  He’s a fan of Bruce Springsteen and finds both Bill and Hillary Clinton inspirational.  That pretty much explains Jim’s manners.

Former Comfort Suites employee, Annie Cole Bullock Cox, from Alabama—and maybe that explains her—shouts, “All this shouting about the votes not being counted right in Fla, this is the same thing that happened in 2000 when we had to wait days to find out who really won the election. Do you people in Fla not know how to count. Give it up the election is over.”  Does she really think the candidates count their own votes? 

Then there is Kevin Singh—“ Hey Allen, since you were so obsessed with allowing insurance companies to deny medical coverage to persons like myself, will you be man enough to give up the taxpayer-funded Cadillac health insurance plan that all congressmen are entitled to and keep after they leave office? Since you're so much against government spending, why not set an example?”   Scintillating intellect, that Kevin.  On his Facebook page, under “About,” he has this blurb—“Reclusive. Live and work out of my home. Have two wonderful boys and a beautiful dog. I have what I need.”  Actually, he doesn’t.

The sad thing is that all these critics of West---not one of whom could score above Category IV on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery---are voters.  It's not the economy, stupid.  That was so twenty years ago.  These days, it's the stupids, stupid!

Rush Limbaugh is right.  It's not that the Republican Party has a "messaging problem,"  America has an idiocy problem.  We are outnumbered.  But this Allen West string is really much more fun if you following on his page.

The Day After

On the Eve of Election Day 2012

The Romney of my choice

Happy Birthday, Rebekah!

The Beekster and her little ones

It was on this day, a few decades back, that the Beek came into the world--via Texas, I might add.  Her first home was on the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.  Since then, she's lived on both sides of the United States and in two foreign countries.  Always been quite the traveler.  Now, she is the joyful mother of her own two little darlings.  And they like to travel, too, especially to Georgia to see their PaPa--which, I might also add, it's about time they did .... hint, hint.

Many happy returns to the Girleez!

On the Term ... “LandWarNet”

“LandWarNet” is essentially a generating force term and should not be used throughout a doctrinal publication to describe signal support to operations. No one in a theater of operations talks about “LandWarNet” — not the geographic combatant commander, not the theater army commander, not the J-staff, not the G-staff, not joint partners, not coalition partners, and certainly not Soldiers who use the network. The Army fights as an integrated member of the joint force. In a joint context, the term LandWarNet is totally meaningless. In Afghanistan, for example, when Soldiers talk about the network they are referring to the “Afghan Mission Network,” not LandWarNet. So the concept of LandWarNet is really irrelevant to operations within a theater of war or theater of operations where the operational Army is likely to be employed.

Moreover, LandWarNet is arguably not even a network (see note); it is simply the Army’s portion ($$) of the GIG. Neither the Army Capstone Concept nor any published joint or Army doctrine defines LandWarNet as a network. In simplest terms, LandWarNet is nothing more than the Army’s portion of the GIG, i.e., those portions of the GIG the life-cycle management costs of which are paid for with Army dollars. LandWarNet is therefore an acquisition term, not an operational term. It is a concern of the generating force, not the operational Army--and we write doctrine not for the former but for the latter. Therefore, the more and lengthier the tired discussions of LandWarNet, the less effective is any field manual that uses the term.

In nearly all instances, use of the term LandWarNet is also doctrinally inaccurate. Take NETOPS, for example. In a well-intentioned effort to draw a distinction between Army signal operations and those similar operations conducted by our sister Services, doctrine writers—in this current draft of FM 6-02—have invented the terms “GIG NETOPS” and “LandWarNet NETOPS.” Both terms are doctrinally incorrect; for Joint doctrine (JP 6-0) defines NETOPS as the activities performed in order to operate or defend the GIG. When signal soldiers perform NETOPS, they are, by definition, operating and defending the GIG, not “LandWarNet.”

So, use LandWarNet in JCIDS documents, where it makes sense, but not in doctrinal publications, where it doesn't.


Note.  ADP 6-0, within the context of describing networks (as components of a commanders' mission command system) makes a single reference to LandWarNet, calling it a "technical nNetwork."