Communications in War

“Logistics and communications,” writes historian, Carlo D’Este, “are the vital supporting cast of waging successful war; to lack for either is to court failure.”  This quote is taken from D’Este’s telling of the story of the Allied forces’ stall at the tail end of the Normandy Campaign in World War II.  Contributing to the sputtering advance of the four Allied armies was General Eisenhower’s (and others’) neglect of his logistics and his communications.[1]

“Eisenhower’s hands were tied by both. His logisticians determined how far his armies could advance, and his signals officers, who controlled the flow of communications into and out of SHAEF, determined how well and how fast he could communicate with his subordinates.”[2]  Pretty straightforward stuff.

When Ike moved his forward headquarters in early September 1944 from “Shellburst,” just inland of the Normandy beaches, to Granville, at the base of the Cotentin Peninsula, he was, for a crucial time, cut off from the forces under his command.  “In effect,” explains D’Este, “he was incommunicado, a serious problem for any commander but a potentially fatal flaw for the one exercising supreme command.”[3]

At the end of his story D’Este makes the doctrinal application, “A headquarters that is uninformed and unable to communicate cannot exercise command and control over operations, and is essentially useless.”[4]

This is exactly the kind of historical anecdote that, if applied to, say, an emerging doctrinal publication on signal support to operations, would make it more readable, understandable, and militarily useful.  Some would resist merely on account that the story is from World War II, and is almost 70 years old.  But a fundamental principle is a fundamental principle, is it not? And an illustration of a fundamental principle teaches like nothing else can.

I mean, for what other reason do we write doctrine?

---

[1] Carlo D'Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002), 592.

[2] Ibid., 593.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

Doctrine 2015's Effect on the Army Field Manual

The Doctrine 2015 framework is having an effect. That point is practically beyond dispute.  What is disputable is what, exactly that effect is.  The first thing to understand about Doctrine 2015 is that it is not about producing better doctrine. Instead, it's about revolutionizing the doctrinal publication development and dissemination paradigm.  Under Doctrine 2015, it's the process--not the product--that matters.

Mostly.

Evidence that the product is suffering may be found in talk that is common these days when the subject of the Doctrine 2015 hierarchy of publications comes up.  It is often said that field manuals are about "what" the Army does and ATPs (Army Techniques Publications) are about "how" the Army does what it does.

Which is nonsense.

Writing Signal Doctrine

Signal is a combat support function. But don’t take my word for it. Look it up in Field Manual 3-90 Tactics, published in 2001 but still valid. The intellectual center of the Army, however, has decreed that we may no longer use the term “combat support,” but that doesn’t change the idea that signal exists to support combat. If you are doctrine writer, even though you may be prevented by the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Leavenworth from describing signal as a combat support capability, you nevertheless must communicate to your target audience that signal’s entire thrust and meaning is to support the combat commander. 

As to specifically what this means, consider the following guidance from General Barry McCaffrey (U.S. Army Retired) to an infantry lieutenant about to deploy into a combat zone to lead an infantry platoon. 

“Some thoughts: 

• Hard work saves lives. Dig, camouflage, rehearse SOPs, study, plan, train between missions. 
• Never be surprised. ... OP/LPs ... 3-man point team ... OPSEC ... do aerial recon ... be quiet on the battlefield. 
• Safety, safety, safety ... getting soldiers killed or maimed by accident is very painful. 
• In contact either shoot, flank and attack, or shoot and withdraw. Always shoot ... get volume fire quickly on the enemy. Practice actions on contact before every mission. 
• The most important weapon on the battlefield is arty/mortars ... be prepared to put HE and smoke on possible enemy locations within three minutes. We rarely know where the fire is actually coming from ... arty will let you move without casualties on the battlefield.”[1]

As a signal doctrine writer, you’ve got to understand that McCaffrey’s words apply to the signal officer just as much as they do to the young infantry lieutenant. For the signal officer, at whatever tactical echelon, must configure his communications assets in such a way that all lieutenants can execute in accordance with the general’s guidance. General McCaffrey is directing an infantry combat leader. The signal officer is enabling that same combat leader. If the field manual doesn’t capture that dynamic, it fails as a doctrinal publication. 

Or, take this example. You are writing about signal support to operations at brigade level. You might chose a Stryker brigade combat team to illustrate this. A Stryker brigade has “more than 3500 Soldiers ... and almost 2000 vehicles, including more than 300 Strykers.”[2] In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (Stryker)—also known as the “Arrowhead Brigade,” was comprised of … 

“the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry; 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry; 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry; 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry; 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery; 296th Brigade Support Battalion; 334th Signal Company; 209th Military Intelligence Company; 13th Engineer Company; and Company C, 52nd Infantry (Antitank). Attached to it for the Iraq deployment are the 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), flying OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, and the 1092nd Combat Engineer Company from the West Virginia Army National Guard."[3]

Obviously, the Stryker brigade is supported by its own organic signal company, in the Arrowhead’s case by the 334th Signal Company. As the doctrine writer, you have to realize that just to say that an SBCT draws its signal support from an organic signal company is insufficient. In fact, it’s practically a waste of time because everybody already knows that. The point you have to get across to your target audience is that that signal company, with support from higher echelons where necessary, is supporting combat operations. The signal officer of a Stryker brigade supports infantry, armored cavalry, field artillery, logistical support, intelligence, engineers, and aircraft. You have to be aware that a unit like this particular SBCT may be augmented with Reserve or National Guard forces that may not be equipped, communications-wise, like their Regular Army brethren—but who still have to be supported. 

And think of signal support to large units like the 3rd Infantry Division which, during the “shock and awe phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, sprinted “720 kilometers in twenty-one days” while firing 610 direct support, ninety counter-fire, and twenty-six reinforcing artillery missions—13,923 155mm rounds and 794 multiple-launch rocket system missiles.[4] Think of how often the division's command posts moved.  Think of the factors of METT-TC.  Sure, it’s a true statement to say that divisions have an organic signal support capability, normally in the form a division signal company. But if that’s all you can say about signal support to division operations, you haven’t learned yet what doctrine is all about. 

Doctrine is “the blueprint for forces in combat.”[5] It is the “fundamental principles by which the military forces, or elements thereof, guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”[6]

Signal Soldiers are not just installing, operating, maintaining, and defending the Army’s portion of the network, they are supporting military operations—chief among them, combat. 

_________________________________

[1] Barry R. McCaffrey, “Lessons in Leadership: E-mail Exchange Between The Bradley Professor and an Infantry Lieutenant,” Army Magazine, June 2005, 16. 

[2] Dennis Steele, “The Stryker: Going Up North,” Army Magazine, March 2004, 44-54. 

[3] Ibid. 

[4] Thomas G. Torrence, “The Division Artillery of the 3rd Infantry Division,” Army Magazine, April 2004, 57-60. 

[5] Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), 253 

[6] Joint Publication 1-02.

Doctrine for Signal Operations

Ostensibly, Field Manual 6-02 is about signal operations. But what does that mean? The question is not as simple as it appears. In the recently circulated author’s draft, there was a lot of describing of organizations—long stretches of descriptive content on theater signal commands, expeditionary signal battalions, network operations and security centers, G-6/S-6 staff sections, and so forth. Alongside this was considerable descriptive content on capabilities—the network, for example, communications security, information assurance, network transport, network services, network management, electromagnetic spectrum management, the list goes on. Sort of a waste of ink, not mention the reader’s time. For, if you picked up FM 6-02 in order to get a clearer idea on what signal operations are all about, you would have found about 200 pages of pedantic obfuscation. If you were looking for “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives,” [1] you wouldn’t have found any. In short, you would have been disappointed.  Indeed, many reviewers were.

I realize that a draft is a draft--and that you circulate a draft in order to solicit feedback and to gauge whether or not you're hitting the target.  And I realize that writing effective doctrine is a difficult endeavor.  That is why I offer this critique.

The central shortcomings, then, of the recently staffed author’s draft of FM 6-02 are two.  The first is the implication that, by its very title, the manual is all about signal operations, when at length one discovers that it is not. Second, and probably more aggravating, is that the manual purports to present doctrine. On both counts, the draft is a whiff. It misses the mark entirely. It leaves one with the impression (and you shake your head that at the U.S. Army Signal Center of Excellence this is even possible) that its authors (a) don’t understand what doctrine is, and (b) don’t know what signal operations are either.

So, how to fix it.

Army Force Management School, Part V

L3-MPRI logo

The instructors teaching the Army Force Management Course are contractors. Each is an employee of a company called L3-MPRI, a division of L-3 Communications Corporation, and each is a retired Army officer with an advanced degree. Each probably has more than 30 years experience in the Army if you combine their service time with their experience afterwards as defense contractors.

I learned this morning that one of the instructors is a retired signal officer, Dr. Gregory Hamlett. Dr. Hamlett recognized right off the bat that I was from Fort Gordon and wanted to know if I worked in the towers (Signal Towers). I am hoping I will get an opportunity to have a conversation with him later in the course to get his thoughts on signal doctrine. He taught two classes this morning, the requirements validation and approval process and materiel development roles and missions.

A lot was thrown at us today. In addition to Dr. Hamlett's classes, we learned about materiel acquisition strategies and contracting; the materiel oversight and review process; and two courses on materiel acquisition, pre-systems acquisition and systems acquisition and sustainment.

Tomorrow afternoon we are expecting the director of materiel from the Army G-8 Force Development staff to come speak to us.

Signal Center Change of Command

Brigadier General Jeffrey W. Foley
Commanding General,
US Army Signal Center and Fort Gordon
The Army's Chief of Signal

Brigadier General Alan R. Lynn
Commanding General
311th Signal Command (Theater)

Brigadier General Jeffrey W. Foley, the Army's Chief of Signal, will relinquish command of the US Army Signal Center and Fort Gordon later this month.  The official date of the change of command ceremony has not yet been announced.  A Farewell dinner for General Foley and his wife is planned for July 15th at the Gordon Club on Fort Gordon.  The dinner is a public event.  Tickets are $20 each and may be obtained from the Protocol Office in Signal Towers on Fort Gordon.

Foley's replacement will be Brigadier General Alan R. Lynn, currently the commander of the 311th Signal Command (Theater) headquartered at Fort Shafter, Hawaii.

RLM Communications, Inc.

This is the sign posted outside my cubicle
in Moran Hall on Fort Gordon

RLM Communications, Inc., is the company I've worked for since the 29th of September 2009. Founded in 2004, RLM is a Service-Disabled, Veteran-Owned business, certified by the Small Business Administration as an 8(a) small disadvantaged business. Headquartered in Spring Lake, NC, RLM employs a staff of more than 150 in ten states, Washington, DC, and in two foreign countries.

Near our headquarters, we serve clients in the Spring Lake vicinity and at Fort Bragg, like the 1st Theater Sustainment Command, the 18th Airborne Corps Mobilization/Deployment Cell (G-5 Mobile Support Element), and the US Army Special Operations Command.  Within the Military District of Washington, our clients include the Treasury Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and customers at Fort Detrick, MD and at Fort Belvoir, VA.  We also have a number of clients at the US Army Signal Center and Fort Gordon, GA and at the Charleston, SC branch of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center.

LandWarNet 2010, Part I

AFCEA logo

Each year, the Army's chief information officer, known as the CIO/G-6 because he is also a member of the Army staff, partners with the Armed Forces Communications-Electronics Association (AFCEA) to stage a forum concerning LandWarNet, the Army's portion of the military's global information grid.  It is a premier forum of its kind, bringing together key government and industry leaders---and interested parties, like me (I am in industry, but I'm not a leader, at least not according to the leaders)---to openly communicate the latest in commercial best business practices and government implementations of commercial solutions for it communications and information networking requirements.

This year's conference will be in Tampa, Florida.  Its theme will be:  LandWarNet: Providing Global Cyber Dominance to Joint/Combined Commanders.

Some Things I Learned this Week

Recent experiences are proving to me, once again, that one is never too old to learn.

335th Signal Command (Theater)

"Ready Lightning,"
335th Signal Command Logo 

Earlier in the week I was part of a team of doctrine writers that visited the 335th Signal Command (Theater) at its East Point, Georgia headquarters.

Signal Support to Army Cyberspace Operations, Part II

The new Army command responsible for cyberspace operations, US Army Forces Cyber Command, or ARFORCYBER, will be formally activated in October of this year. It will be the Army's piece of the larger Department of Defense command, US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), activated just last month under the command of General Keith Alexander. In doctrinal terms, ARFORCYBER will serve as the Army Service component command to USCYBERCOM.

Coincident with the activation of this new Army command, the Army is revising it's capstone doctrinal manual, FM 3-0 Operations, published by the Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth. Together, these two events have the potential of making a dramatic impact upon the US Army Signal Corps.

Signal Support to Army Cyberspace Operations

As the lead author of FM 6-02 Signal Support to Army Operations, the Signal Regiment's keystone doctrinal manual, it seems clear that, sooner or later, there will be a requirement to set forth in signal doctrine the tenets of signal support to Army operations in the cyberspace domain. Without a doubt, the primary driver behind this inevitable requirement is the activation of an Army Service Component Command subordinate to the recently established joint sub-unified command, US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM).