335th Signal Command (Theater)

"Ready Lightning,"
335th Signal Command Logo 

Earlier in the week I was part of a team of doctrine writers that visited the 335th Signal Command (Theater) at its East Point, Georgia headquarters.

The 335th SC(T) is a CONUS-based, multi-component organization that supports the US Army Reserve (USARC) and the US Forces Central Command (ARCENT)/3rd Army. ARCENT is the US Central Command's theater army. To support USARC’s mission, the 335th HQ provides two theater tactical signal brigades (TTSBs), a chemical (CBRN) brigade, two regional support groups, four expeditionary signal battalions, a combat camera (COMCAM) company, and a tactical installation and networking (TIN) company. The command also operates a forward-based provisional headquarters in Kuwait that provides signal support (network engineering and architecture) to ARCENT. The 335th has been supporting operations within CDRUSCENTCOM’s area of responsibility since the first Gulf War. It’s provisional HQ was deployed in late 2001.

MG Stuart M. Dyer, commander of the 335th SC(T), is also the ARCENT G-6.

In CONUS, the 335th SC(T) trains, equips, mobilizes, and deploys forces in support of contingency operations. It plans and conducts an annual exercise, called Grecian Firebolt, to sustain and hone its critical skills and core competencies. During Grecian Firebolt, 335th provides overarching communications support to a series of functional exercises, warrior exercises, and combat support training centers. Major General Dyer's office invited the Signal Center to send representatives to observe the exercise from the command's network operations control center in East Point. That invitation is what led to my being asked to travel there. I actually did more observing of the 335th than I did of the exercise.

The command also provides communications support for ARCENT and CENTCOM OCONUS exercises Lucky Warrior, Lucky Strike, and Bright Star. Their support for those is run totally separate from their forward-based operations in Kuwait. To support the extended campaigns in southwest Asia, 335th provides a surge capability in addition to its standard replacement of individual Soldiers.

Through its CBRN assets, 335th provides support to USNORTHCOM’s homeland defense mission and to OCONUS contingency operations.

In Kuwait, the 335th SC(T)(Provisional) supports ARCENT/3rd Army within the area of responsibility of CDRUSCENTCOM. This support includes critical communication support to ARCENT’s operational and early entry command posts. This forward deployed, provisional command provides engineering and integration guidance to operational commanders on the constantly evolving network architecture in southwest Asia.

Brigadier General James T. Walton, Commander, 335th SC(T)(Provisional) has a dual-hatted responsibility as the ARCENT/3rd Army (Fwd) G-6 and is thus the ARCENT commander’s “point man” for LandWarNet capabilities in theater. He has operational control (OPCON) of the 160th and 7th theater tactical signal brigades (TTSBs), the ARCENT G-6 section, the theater network operations and security center (TNOSC), and that area's regional computer emergency response team (RCERT), as well as oversight responsibility for Title 10 support of communications and information systems projects (mostly contracts--valued at approx. $300M) in forward and rear areas of operations within theater. These responsibilities encompass the coordination and planning support necessary to operate multiple joint HQs, coalition partner support, and the interfaces to the other Service components.  The 335th SC(T)(Provisional) manages operations at the Camp Arifjian regional hub node and ARCENT’s Signal University for sustainment training in theater.

Some other interesting facts about the 335th SC(T) ... It is one of four theater signal commands supporting Army operations.  Two of these (the 5th and the 7th) are active component (AC) units; the other two (the 311th and the 335th) are reserve component (RC) units.  The 335th is actually a multi-component organization comprised of AC, RC, and Active Guard Reserve (AGR) elements.  It is OPCONed to USARC during peacetime and to ARCENT during wartime.

The command operates from a split based concept.  Headquartered in East Point, GA, the 335th also maintains a forward deployed HQ in Kuwait.  In theory, this works similar to how a corps’ or division’s main and contingency command posts work together. In practice, however, there are significant differences.  For instance, the East Point headquarters is necessarily focused on USARC missions, annual training exercises, and support to contingency operations.  The focus in Kuwait is on support to contingency operations in theater, to the needs of operational maneuver commanders, to joint and coalition operations, and to the command's multi-million dollar contract management responsibilities. 

There is an argument going on within the Army about whether the Army actually needs theater signal commands or whether the functions of these organizations cannot be more cost effectively borne by strategic signal brigades.  A large part of the argument against the SC(T)s is that there is little uniformity to them--to their organizational structure and to their operational missions.  Some of the powers that be want doctrine to be written in a one-size-fits-all manner that covers the 5th, 7th, 311th, 335th, and any other SC(T) that may be organized in the future.

But that is a flimsy argument, an argument that ignores some obvious realities.  One thing obvious is the geographic differences between these commands.  From a glance at a map, one can pretty well surmise, for example, that 5th SC(T)'s mission and they way it organizes to conduct it will of necessity differ from their counterparts in other regions.  Moreover, consider that in one particular combatant commander's area of responsibility, CDRUSCENTCOM's, operations are being conducted against a hostile enemy.  Thus 335th will necessarily organize itself and conduct its operations differently than other SC(T)s.  The question that must be asked is why on Earth would we demand an artificial doctrinal uniformity between these commands when there has never been and never will be any similarity in their operational environments or in their operational missions?

But, probably more important than anything else, is that the argument against theater signal commands, for the above mentioned reasons, is an argument that assumes that a central planner, that is, someone employed in a CDID somewhere, is better qualified to determine what should or should not be done with operational forces than the operational commanders themselves.  Our doctrine for network operations says that the network will be aligned to support the operational maneuver chain of command.  It says that combatant commanders are the "owners" of the network.  We're even going back to a previously discarded term, the Theater Information Grid (TIG), to describe the focus of a regional commander's area of responsibility, as distinguished from a centrally managed Global Information Grid (GIG).  If the network is a commander's asset, if it is owned by commanders, if its operations are truly aligned with the critical requirements operational maneuver commanders, then of course one SC(T) will look and operate differently.  

Certainly, one thing my visit to East Point confirmed is that the 335th SC(T) has a unique mission, and they do it quite well.  We should write doctrine that supports the idea of mission, organizational, and operational differentiation between these commands as they are providers of one of the most critical operational capabilities in the Army's arsenal: a globally supported, regionally focused communications and information systems network that supports and enables mission command.

Now, if they'd just find it in their hearts to send me to Germany so I can write about the 5th SC(T).