Preparing for the Next War

General John R. Galvin

"We in the military often are accused falsely of “preparing to fight not the next war but the last.”  That criticism is not well placed: we are not, for the most part, obtuse enough to fight yesterday’s war—but we might be doing something worse still.  When we think about the possibilities of conflict we tend to invent for ourselves a comfortable vision of war, a theater with battlefields we know, conflict that fits our understanding of strategy and tactics, a combat environment that is consistent and predictable, fightable with the resources we have, one that fits our plans, our assumptions, our hopes, and our preconceived ideas.  We arrange in our minds a war we can comprehend in our own terms, usually with an enemy that looks like us and acts likes us.  This comfortable conceptualization becomes the accepted way of seeing things and, as such, ceases to be an object of further investigation unless it comes under serious challenge as a result of some major event—usually a military disaster."[1]

---

[1] General John R. Galvin, U.S. Army, “Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm,” Parameters, Winter, 1986.

 

Another One Bites the Dust

"A senior al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leader who is wanted for his involvement in the USS Cole attack in 2000 and a failed airplane bombing over Detroit in 2009, and who currently leads a terrorist cell in Yemen, was killed in a US drone strike in Yemen today."

Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/05/uss_cole_bomber_kill.php#ixzz1u8ZsXkav

The U.S. victory in the Gulf War

Just catching up on a little reading and study of the first Iraq war, aka the Gulf War.  What a mixed bag it was.


The U.S. victory in the Gulf War was of the type from which many drew warning rather than celebration. The six month build-up of overwhelming force in theater only to face a very weak and extremely poorly led foe did not exactly send a signal to America’s would-be adversaries that the U.S. was too powerful for them.  While the U.S. accomplished its major objective of expelling Iraq from Kuwait, it failed to bring stability to the region.  Saddam Hussein was left in power and the end of the war only commenced a twelve-year enforcement of no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq.  The conventional-type fight that was the Gulf War was the kind of warfare for which the U.S. dedicated itself following its demoralizing loss in the counterinsurgency fight in Vietnam.  It was a display of the military’s AirLand Battle doctrine, and was the way the U.S. intended to fight the Soviets on the plains of Europe in the event that the Red Army stormed the Fulda Gap.  But there were plenty of warning signs that suggested the U.S. was fortunate to be facing Saddam’s forces and not the Kremlin’s.  Against the Soviets in Europe, the U.S. would not be afforded the luxury of building up forces for six months prior to the commencement of hostilities.  Lightly armored forces—the first ones to deploy into the southwest Asian theater—would be no match for heavy Soviet divisions.  Air power alone could not dislodge even the Iraqis from their Kuwaiti redoubts.  How much less effective would it be against more capable Soviet forces?  Nevertheless, some positive things were accomplished.  To a certain extent, the military was able to erase the stigma of Vietnam and garner widespread national appreciation for the job it does for the nation.  Valuable experience was gained that stood the U.S. in good stead when, a dozen years later, its forces would be called upon again to take on the Iraqi Army.  Diplomatically, there was much to be admired in the way the U.S. forged and managed such a broad and diverse coalition—also something that would pay dividends down the road.  The bottom line is that the Gulf war was a victory for the U.S. and victories are something you take whenever you can get them, no matter how ugly they might be.

Ike on U.S. Strategy in Europe in the Second World War

Speaking as General Eisenhower on the U.S. military strategy in Europe in World War II ---

General Eisenhower

The first problem we were faced with in World War II, once we were officially in the war, was that it was a war in two widely separated theaters.  We were fighting both in Europe and in the Pacific.  Obviously, would could not fight in both places equally well at the same time.  We settled, however, almost immediately upon a “Europe-first” strategy, devoting the preponderance of our efforts in that theater while trying to use our remaining resources in such a way as to gain time and prevent further decay of our situation in the Pacific.

However, before we would really establish ourselves in the European theater, there was the problem of mobilizing a fighting force and figuring out where best to insert that force into the fight.  Working with our British allies, who shortly after our entry into the war felt themselves unready to embark upon a cross channel invasion of the continent straight into the enemies teeth, we worked out a way —operation TORCH — to help them push the Germans out of French and British territorial possessions on the continent of North Africa.  This required amphibious landings in Morocco and Algiers and a linking up with our British allies in Tunisia and a vast pincer movement against Rommel’s forces.  The operation took much longer and was far more costly than we would have liked, but it gave us tremendous battlefield experience and helped us reset our corps- and division-level leadership prior to undertaking further operations against the European mainland.

Europe First in WW2

Map of Europe showing divisions between
Allied and Axis powers

The “Europe First” strategy, derived from the ABC-1 Allied Staff Agreement of March 1941, recognized that the Axis center of gravity lay with Germany’s economic ability to prosecute the war with little to no reliance upon Italy or Japan. Therefore, the sooner—and heavier—that Allied warmaking capabilities were deployed to the European theater, the swifter would be the German defeat and the shorter the overall war.

There was dissention among FDR’s military chiefs over the practicality of a Europe-first strategy. Most disagreement stemmed from the psychological angle, meaning that it was the Japanese who actually attacked the nation, not the Germans, therefore we should dispose of the Japanese first. That was the thinking, more or less, of men like MacArthur, King, and Nimitz, to a certain extent. But their thinking was also influenced my military necessity in that, to fight even an economy of force action in the Pacific theater required resources and resources were not to be had in sufficient quantities because of the Europe-first strategy. Moreover, in actually executing the Europe-first plan, the U.S. went to Africa first relying upon the Soviet Union to bleed German Wehrmacht strength before undertaking an actual assault upon the European continent, and even then assaulting weaker Italy than the European mainland, and this almost a full year into the war since Pearl Harbor.

The Mexican-American War as Told by General Winfield Scott ... Sort of

Winfield Scott led the southern thrust in the
Mexican-American War

At the start of the Mexican campaign of 1847, our—the president’s—objectives were to apply economic pressure to Mexico to force them to yield to the president’s territorial demands.  Essentially, these were that Mexico recognize the Rio Grande as the southern border of Texas and agree to sell to the United States the territories of New Mexico and California.  We began with a naval blockade of the Mexican Gulf coast, to put immediate pressure upon the Mexican economy.  I knew however that, in order to accomplish our objectives, sooner or later we would have to essentially repeat Cortes’ march to the valley of Mexico before we could ever hope to force the Mexican government’s capitulation.

Given that we faced no enemy on the open seas, the president sent Matthew Perry’s forces to set up the blockade.  The blockade was successful and the navy even had some success on land, taking the towns of Frontera and Tampico.  General Taylor advanced to the mouth of the Rio Grande and soon he was able to move against Monterrey which was defended by General Pedro de Ampudia.

Boykin and Black Hawk Down

Lt. Gen. William G.  "Jerry" Boykin

Ken Blackwell and Ken Klukowski, writing for Big Peace, have published an article about Lieutenant General William G. (“Jerry”) Boykin.  The purpose of their piece was to counter some of the prevailing media bias against General Boykin because of his religious beliefs.  General Boykin is in the news because he has declined, under pressure from the controversial organization known as CAIR, or the Council on American-Islamic Relations, an invitation from West Point to speak at a prayer breakfast.

Ken Blackwell is a conservative writer.  Ken Klukowski is an attorney.  Neither man served in the military and their bios show nothing that would qualify either of them as military historians.

This is relevant because, in their Big Peace article, attempting to burnish the image of General Boykin, they write that Boykin was "the commanding officer of the mission in the Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia forever memorialized in the movie Black Hawk Down."

Author Mark Bowden, author of the book Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War, never mentions Boykin.  Neither does retired colonel David H. Hackworth in his book, Hazardous Duty.  Hackworth covered U.S. operations in Somalia during the time of the Black Hawk Down incident as a correspondent for Newsweek.  Both of these men name Major General William F. Garrison as the commanding officer during the Battle of Mogadishu. [1]

Why General Dwight Eisenhower was not Relieved After the Debacle at Kasserine Pass

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

On the face of it, the sacking of General Dwight D. Eisenhower in the wake of the stunning Allied defeat at Kasserine Pass seemed certain, but he was not relieved. Though a strong case could have been made for his immediate dismissal, the issue of whether he should stay or go was never raised. Cooler heads prevailed. Career-wise, the man who would go on to earn five stars and become the nation’s 34th president lived to fight another day.

It is customary when armies are routed upon the field of battle that their commanders—assuming their failure to obtain the honor of their death in combat—are fired, sacked, relieved, replaced. Already in World War II the Army and Navy had seen this custom followed. Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel and General Walter Short, both commanders in the Pacific, had been forced into retirement, as a consequence of their failures related to the Japanese surprise attack upon the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. The chief of naval operations, Admiral Harold Stark had for the very same reasons been denied a theater command. The debacle for U.S. and British forces at Kasserine Pass and the subsequent maintenance of its responsible commander, General Eisenhower as theater commander represents an interesting deviation from this custom. After Kasserine, Eisenhower would rise, Phoenix-like, to become the Supreme Allied Commander, earn a fifth star, and later become president of the United States.

When Schwarzkopf Met Westmoreland, by Don North

Don North was a free-lance photographer and videographer who happened one day, in August 1965, upon a chance encounter between General William Westmoreland, commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam and one of his young officers who would one day command the U.S. led coalition in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.  That officer was just a major then.  His name was H. Norman Schwarzkopf.

General Westmoreland (L), Major Schwarzkopf (C)
Photo by: Don North

North explains the two officers’ meeting as a photo opportunity for Westmoreland.  Microphones were not allowed but cameramen and photographers could shoot film and take pictures at a respectable distance.  They were quite a study in contrasts.  Schwarzkopf, filthy from field duty and smelling of death, made the general “recoil a little.”  The general, arriving from his headquarters in the rear, was turned out in freshly laundered and starched fatigues. 

Footage of the two officers speaking with one another appeared on the nightly news.  Without audio the video created an impression quite different from what actually transpired, according to Schwarzkopf.

This is interesting because, in the two men’s histories there are some notable similarities.

• As senior commanders, both men chose to command operations from the rear.
• Westmoreland is widely blamed for losing the war in Vietnam; Schwarzkopf took a lot of heat for the coalition’s not winning outright in the Gulf War.
• Both men addressed joint sessions of congress.

North reports that Schwarzkopf characterized the meeting as a photo op, saying that Westmoreland asked him nothing about his mission, not even an “atta-boy” for a job well done.  Instead, according to Schwarzkopf he asked about the quality of the chow the troops were getting and if they were receiving mail. 

Schwarzkopf’s mother, wrote North, happened to catch the news when that segment ran.  Without the benefit of sound, her impression was that Westmoreland was a most caring man and capable leader.  Then-major Schwarzkopf said that the episode caused him to lose whatever respect he had for the general. [1]

General Scharzkopf during
DESERT STORM

Loss of respect is something else Schwarzkopf has in common with his Vietnam counterpart.  Schwarzkopf wasn’t given to the kind of photo-op described in North’s article, of the type made to enhance his public image.  On the contrary, his public image needed no enhancement.  Instead, as the supported combatant commander in the Gulf War, Schwarzkopf earned the disrespect of nearly everyone who worked for him, up to and including officers of flag rank, by failing to control his temper.  Characterizing the infamous Schwarzkopf temper as a “sweeping [of] his headquarters with verbal grapeshot month after month,” author Rick Atkinson described the CENTCOM headquarters as “a dispirited bunker, where initiative withered and even senior generals hesitated to bring him unpleasant tidings.” [2]  Others have written about Schwarzkopf’s “counterproductive, fear-inducing tirades.” [3].   Retired Army colonel, David Hackworth put it this way when trying to explain the CENTCOM commander’s leadership style.  “Schwarzkopf,” he wrote, “sat in his bunker and bellowed and fretted.” [4]

Implications

I actually learned more in this article about General Westmoreland than I did about General Schwarzkopf.  The article itself was not all that informative.  However, General Westmoreland as a subject, linked this to one of the articles analyzed last week.  That one, painting the general in a more positive light; and, this one, showing a negative side of him, suggests that General Westmoreland was a very complicated man.  At the same time, reading the article and writing this synopsis made me realize how little I still actually know about General Westmoreland and the war in Vietnam.  Several avenues of thought, prompted by this study, run out to inconclusive ends.  One concerns the Army’s attitude, at the time of the Vietnam War, compared to its frame of reference at the time of the Gulf War.  General Schwarzkopf led an Army that was still emotionally scarred by Vietnam.  A large part of the motivation to win in the Gulf seemed to be to finally get over the ‘Vietnam syndrome.’  “No more Vietnams,” was a phrase we heard often.  My curiosity is piqued over what were the Army’s and the nation’s attitudes about Vietnam in relation to the Korean War, a conflict for which we were very much unprepared and which also was considered lost.  Why did we not hear talk of “no more Korea’s?”   The other still significantly unformed conception about Vietnam is about the actual fighting and whether or not it is true to say that the U.S. won the engagements on the battlefield but lost them in the press.  Was it our political leadership that failed us, or was it the military?  See, all this is why I signed up to study military history.

Notes.

1.  Don North, “When Schwarzkopf Met Westmoreland,” History Net (March 17, 2011),   http://www.
historynet.com/when-schwarzkopf-met-westmoreland.htm (accessed December 14, 2011).

2.  Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (New York, Houghton-Mifflin, 1993), 3.

3.  Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co., 1995), 148.

4.  David H. Hackworth, Hazardous Duty (New York, William Morrow and Co., 1996), 59.

"The bestial nature of those ..."

President Reagan's remarks to reporters on the death of American and French military personnel in Beirut, Lebanon, October 23, 1983 ... twenty-eight years ago, today.

I'm not going to take any questions this morning because we're going right into meetings on the events that have taken place on this tragic weekend. But I would like to make this statement:

I know there are no words that can express our sorrow and grief over the loss of those splendid young men and the injury to so many others. I know there are no words, also, that can ease the burden of grief for the families of those young men.

Likewise, there are no words to properly express our outrage and, I think, the outrage of all Americans at the despicable act, following as it does on the one perpetrated several months ago, in the spring, that took the lives of scores of people at our Embassy in that same city, in Beirut.

But I think we should all recognize that these deeds make so evident the bestial nature of those who would assume power if they could have their way and drive us out of that area that we must be more determined than ever that they cannot take over that vital and strategic area of the Earth or, for that matter, any other part of the Earth.

Thank you.

Read more at the American Presidency Project:   www.presidency.ucsb.eduhttp://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=40673#ixzz1bdnG9o9K 


http://tonyhowardsblog.blogspot.com

President Bush Speaking at Flight 93 Memorial near Shanksville, Pennsylvania on the 10th Anniversary of 9/11

http://tonyhowardsblog.blogspot.com/

Army Force Management School, Part IV

Sean Naylor's book

The biggest challenge of the last couple of days in the Army Force Management Course has been to stay awake. We had had our first test on Friday (I passed) then settled in to learning about the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).  I went through a two-week course on JCIDS back in October, so going through the chain of documents and milestone decisions for a second time is, to use a military euphemism, a challenge.  The most interesting blocks of instruction (death by PowerPoint) have been the Future Force Warfighting Concept Development and Experimentation; Science and Technology and Army Modernization; and, believe it or not, the class on Cost-Benefit Analysis Overview.

During my down time, I am enjoying reading Sean Naylor's account of the early days of the war in Afghanistan, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda.  I actually started it back home, but because of I was so busy and had several other books started, it was difficult to get in to; but, with all those distractions removed, I'm finding it a riveting read.  There is a very interesting review of the book on the Pritzker Military Library's website, here.

This was no Bus Accident!

Without Hesitation: Comments on General Hugh Shelton's Book

I read General Hugh Shelton's book, Without Hesitation: The Odyssey of an American Warrior. It was a great read. (Btw, the other day, I discovered that General Shelton has a Facebook page. I sent him a friend request which he promptly was accepted).

This is a book that my late stepfather, John Edinger, would have enjoyed.  John loved military history.  He would have especially loved reading about a fellow North Carolinian, who graduated from NC State University, who not only served in the military, but rose to become the highest ranking military officer in the United States.

Good Thinking Music

From the Soundtrack to the movie, Gods and Generals, sung by Mary Fahl



They say there's a place
where dreams have all gone
They never said where
but I think I know
It's miles through the night
just over the dawn
on the road that will take me home

I know in my bones
I've been here before
The ground feels the same
though the land's been torn
I've a long way to go
The stars tell me so
on this road that will take me home

Love waits for me 'round the bend
Leads me endlessly on
Surely sorrows shall find their end
and all our troubles will be gone
And I'll know what I've lost
and all that I've won
when the road finally takes me home

And when I pass by
don't lead me astray
Don't try to stop me
Don't stand in my way
I'm bound for the hills
where cool waters flow
on this road that will take me home

Love waits for me 'round the bend
Leads me endlessly on
Surely sorrows shall find their end
and all our troubles will be gone
And we'll know what we've lost
and all that we've won
when the road finally takes me home

I'm going home
I'm going home
I'm going home

Leonard Slatkin Conducts the BBC Orchestra on September 15, 2001

To me, September 11 is not just a single day to remember and then forget until the next year, like one's birthday, or Columbus Day.  Nor is it a day to just remember what happened, awful as it was.  We should think about that day much more often.  And we should also think about what is still happening.  Because September 11, 2001 was not the start of a conflict.  Neither were the wars that followed it a conclusion.