Post Doctrine 2015 ... Here's Hoping

"There are things that we have learned that make us a more effective force on the battlefield, and I think we want to go ahead with those lessons."  -- Gen. Robert W. Cone, commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, on why the Army should increase focus on Strategic Landpower.

General Robert Cone

Well said. But you won't find much about those words in a Doctrine 2015 publication. Apparently, the guidance is that there isn't enough room to write about them, that we have to cut down on the contents in order to make the doctrine more "accessible." So, no side stories. No snippets from history. No illustrative case studies or vignettes. No quotations from effective leaders. No interviews.

Like other good ideas half-way thought out, Doctrine 2015 will pass. When it is finally realized that all these new-fangled publications--ADPs, ADRPs, ATPs, and FMs with only tactics (not) and procedures (sometimes)--really haven't made all that much of an improvement in terms of actual doctrine, there will be a new campaign with new buzz words. When it finally dawns on the brass that Soldiers are getting most of their doctrinal information from social media--because who wants to click through six, eight, or a dozen publications for something--that old standby, the field manual will make a comeback. 

And maybe, the powers that be will actually be anxious to capture those valuable lessons learned in doctrinal publications once again. It could happen!

In the Interest of Doctrine, and History

Delivering publications in spite of the need ...
for actual doctrine

As one long interested in military history, lately become a student of it, the subject of military doctrine fascinates me.  This happened quite by accident.  In 2007 barely started on a new job as a civilian training specialist, having retired from active duty only a couple years before and working as a contractor since, my former boss called me one day with an offer, should I be inclined, to leave government civil service after just a few months, to become a contractor once again, as a doctrine writer.  To make a short story longer, I accepted the offer and made the move, which took me out of the training side of the TRADOC house—where, counting my service time, I had been working for twenty-five years—and placed me in another world.

Ostensibly, the name of this other world was doctrine development, but I soon discovered that the larger universe which doctrine inhabited at the time was the realm of capability development, every bit as interesting as anything else I had experience in my quarter century’s association with the Army—all of which was in signal, I should add. My first six months in this new world was a struggle just to learn the new vocabulary and a new set of regulations associated with doctrine and capability development and integration.  Not to mention a new way of thinking.  Maybe to say six months is to give the impression that during that phase I mastered all there is to know about these areas.  That certainly was not the case.  Far from it.  Almost six years later I find myself still learning, like I’m starting from scratch sometimes—which is one of the reasons I find doctrine so fascinating.

The Squad: Foundation of the Decisive Force

This is absolutely great. It foreshadows significant capability gelling within the force at the squad level. These things are needed and there will be great payoff in terms of near-future operations. But it shows also, I think, that the Army sees itself more and more in an operational environment that dictates a wide area security approach to war as opposed to combined arms maneuver.  This could be a stroke of genious, or it could be problematic in circumstances yet unforeseen.  It's something to watch.

Capabilities are developed to fill needs. Current capability development emphasis on the squad indicates that Army resources of late have been steered to other areas and that, consequently, squad-level capabilities have suffered. That's sort of the nature of the beast. The Army must direct its appropriations to where they are most needed. We can't have everything we want whenever we want it. Finally, the guys at the 'edge' are in the spotlight.

Oh, and one fact is inescapable.  The Army these days sure makes much better promotional and informational-type videos that it used to.

The Army Continues to Transition

Ladies and Gentlemen, the Army of 2020 ...

Army Writing

I discovered a handbook once published by the Army's Training and Doctrine Command called the "Action Officer's Guide: Staff Writing." It's actually a very useful little pamphlet. It's purpose was to help action officers avoid bad writing. In it, the author, a gentleman by the name of John Beckno, counsels against what is described in a politically correct manner as "bureaucratic writing." "While some bureaucratic writing is good," he says, "much of it is turgid, passive, and confusing."

He might also have added that it is 'bromidic,' 'inane,' 'boring,' 'dull,' 'stilted,' 'affected,' 'stuffy,' 'ponderous,' 'unclear,' 'leaden,' 'dismal,' 'uninteresting,' tedious,' 'monotonous,' 'dry,' 'unexciting,' 'mind-numbing,' and 'lifeless.' But then, that would have been bad staff writing.

For all we know, Mr. Beckno could have been describing a random doctrine publication; but he was, in fact, addressing all types of writing which may fall within the purview of a typical action officer.

"In spite of efforts to eradicate it," writes the expert, "poor writing still survives."

But how can this be so?

Beckno lists five reasons ...

• "It's embedded in the bureaucracy." Embedded is the right word. It's a deep problem, part of the culture. As new people enter the service they conform to this horrible way of writing just as though they thought it mandatory, like the bad haircuts.

What is a Field Manual?

TRADOC Regulation 25-36

"A field manual is a Department of the Army publication that contains principles, tactics, procedures, and other doctrinal information. It describes how the Army and its organizations conduct operations and train for those operations. FMs describe how the Army executes operations described in the ADPs. They fully integrate and comply with the fundamental principles in the ADPs and the tactics and principles discussed in the ADRPs."  [Emphasis added.]

To say that, under Doctrine 2015, a field manual describes "what" and an Army Techniques Publication describes "how" is to put an entirely artificial construction upon doctrine.  It is also inconsistent with the regulation that governs doctrine.

Some helpful definitions.

Doctrine 2015's Effect on the Army Field Manual

The Doctrine 2015 framework is having an effect. That point is practically beyond dispute.  What is disputable is what, exactly that effect is.  The first thing to understand about Doctrine 2015 is that it is not about producing better doctrine. Instead, it's about revolutionizing the doctrinal publication development and dissemination paradigm.  Under Doctrine 2015, it's the process--not the product--that matters.

Mostly.

Evidence that the product is suffering may be found in talk that is common these days when the subject of the Doctrine 2015 hierarchy of publications comes up.  It is often said that field manuals are about "what" the Army does and ATPs (Army Techniques Publications) are about "how" the Army does what it does.

Which is nonsense.

Dempsey vs. DePuy: The Impact of Two Generals on Army Doctrine

General DePuy

In the late 1970s, General William DePuy, as TRADOC commander (the first, incidentally), considered how he could improve Army doctrine. The Vietnam War had been recently concluded and the Army was wrestling with its lessons. From 1977 to 1981 there was "vigorous debate and rethinking of fundamental Army doctrine."[1] The outcome of all that thinking and debate—under General DePuy’s leadership—was the AirLand Battle Doctrine. 

In 2010, the TRADOC commander at the time, General Martin Dempsey (now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), considered how he might improve Army doctrine. Wars of long duration in Afghanistan and Iraq were drawing to a close and the Army was wrestling with more lessons learned. Similar to that earlier era, the closing years of this century’s first decade and the opening couple years of the next one have witnessed a vigorous debate and continuous rethinking of fundamental Army doctrine. The outcome of all that thinking—with General Dempsey’s guidance—is “Doctrine 2015.” 

General DePuy’s contribution was a fundamental shift in the Army’s blueprint for war fighting. In his day, the Army’s capstone war fighting doctrine was FM 11-5 Operations. That field manual no longer exists. 

General Dempsey

General Dempsey’s contribution to doctrine, so far, has been nearly half a decade of striving about words to no profit—full spectrum operations—combined arms maneuver and wide area security—co-creation of context—unified land operations—and a cosmetic reorganization of TRADOC’s doctrine library. Today, the Army’s capstone war fighting manual is Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 Unified Land Operations. The basic difference between what is essentially Dempsey’s FM 110-5 and DePuy’s version is that in today’s Army a capstone really isn’t a capstone. For ADP 3-0 cannot stand on its own; it requires the support of another document, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0 Unified Land Operations. 

There are other differences. FM 100-5 was developed with a definite potential enemy and probable area of operations in mind. ADP 3-0 (and its sister, ADRP 3-0) envisions a “complex operational environment.” AirLand Battle was about fighting. Unified Land Operations is about relationships. The former contained real doctrine, fundamental principles meant to guide Army forces or elements thereof in pursuit of the nation’s warfighting objectives. The latter is an annotated dictionary of operational terms and definitions with a fancy digital photo on its cover. 

From Washington to Grant to Pershing to DePuy to Dempsey, everyone in the Army has always understood what a field manual was. Today, despite two years of aggressive selling, it’s hard to find a Soldier who has a handle on what Doctrine 2015 is all about. 

On the subject of Army doctrine, the comparison between Generals DePuy and Dempsey boils down to this.  One general's overriding  concern was about what the manuals said. The other's is essentially about what they look like. 

________________________

[1] John J. Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War (Fort Monroe, Virginia: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Military History Office, 1996), 16.

Some Thoughts on Doctrine 2015

Doctrine 2015 is about reorganizing the doctrinal publications process. It is not about producing better doctrine. 

During his tenure as the TRADOC commander, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey had the Army’s School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas study what could be done to improve Army doctrine. There was indeed considerable room for improvement. As the commander of TRADOC, the Army’s architect of the ‘Army of the future,’ General Dempsey served as the lead doctrine developer for the Army. He asked the smart folks at SAMS to come up with some recommendations on basically how to do two things—

• Make doctrine more accessible to Soldiers. 

• Get products to the field faster. 

Doctrine 2015 Update

The 'Doctrine 2015' hierarchy

Recently, I was asked to review an author's draft of an emerging publication ... Army Techniques Publication 4-16 Movement Control.  The U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) is the preparing activity responsible for this publication.  It's an update and republication of Field Manual (FM) 4-01.30 Movement Control as an ATP.  Under the guidance of the Army's Doctrine 2015 concept, there will only be 50 FMs.  Those that didn't make the cut, if the material in them is still relevant, are to be converted to ATPs.  That's what CASCOM is doing with FM 4-01.30, converting it to ATP 4-16, updating a thing or two in its content in the process.

Although I judged it a reasonably well written draft, and that it contained no language inconsistent with emerging signal doctrine, I had to submit a critical comment on it, because of the timing of this draft's staffing to an Army-wide audience.  We are a good year now into the concept of Doctrine 2015, the SAMS-developed, CSA-approved, doctrine refinement concept the purpose of which is to streamline the Army's inventory of doctrinal publications and put more relevant doctrine into the hands of Soldiers faster.  Still, there are a lot of people who don't understand the transformation.  I've used this blog to write about Doctrine 2015 before.  I still get questions, like "What's an ADP?"  Which is higher, and FM or an ADRP?  "Do we still have ATTPs? or just ATPs?"   

Shaping the Army of 2020

 TRADOC video.

tonyhowardsblog.blogspot.com

TRADOC Commander Drops a Little Doctrine Factoid

In a recent Army Times article, General Robert Cone, commanding general of the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), told his audience what to expect in the near future as the Army begins to transform again.  "Expect a lot of training," he said, "in leadership principles, the profession of arms, autonomous squad operations, combined arms maneuver, and wide-area security."  Elaborating a bit, the general explained--

"What is needed are training programs that amplify the complexity and sophistication of combat, he said. Cone pointed to his time as the “head lessons-learned dude” early in the Iraq war. He described how soldiers arrived trained for major combat operations, but didn’t get a lot of help from doctrine when the mission transitioned to counterinsurgency. Soldiers on the ground responded by forming their own solutions .... The challenge is to ensure the same evolution that takes place on the battlefield — birthed by necessity in the most demanding of circumstances — continues in training."

But what really caught my eye was a comment General Cone made concerning doctrine.  He cited "a backlog of 436 man-years in doctrine development, according to a Sept. 21 Government Accountability Office report."  That includes assessment, research, writing, editing, and publication.  A 436 may-year chasm!  Stating the issue slightly differently, the general said that "only 37 percent of the [Army's] 447 doctrinal publications are current.

In terms of signal doctrine, my estimate is that doctrinal publication currency is running about half of the Army-wide percentage.


http://tonyhowardsblog.blogspot.com/

General Dempsey on the Army Capstone and Operating Concepts

On April 11, 2011 General Dempsey will succeed General Casey as the Chief of Staff of the Army.

Lawmakers want fewer contractors doing training

If you're scratching your head after reading this Army Times article, you're not the only one.  Lawmakers want fewer contractors doing training - Army News, news from Iraq, - Army Times.

"Lawmakers want fewer contractors doing training," shouts the headline.  Plainly, someone in the upper echelons of the the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), or the Army, or in the Pentagon, or in Congress, is shouting fire.  Only there is no fire.  Not a single measurable, identifiable problem was described in the article.

Only perceptions.  For contractors are doing a lot of jobs that government normally does.  And in the current climate in Washington, this is bad.