Signal is a combat support function. But don’t take my word for it. Look it up in
Field Manual 3-90 Tactics, published in 2001 but still valid.
The intellectual center of the Army, however, has decreed that we may no longer use the term “combat support,” but that doesn’t change the idea that signal
exists to support combat. If you are doctrine writer, even though you may be prevented by the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Leavenworth from describing signal as a combat support capability, you nevertheless must communicate to your target audience that signal’s
entire thrust and meaning is to support the combat commander.
As to specifically what this means, consider the following guidance from
General Barry McCaffrey (U.S. Army Retired) to an infantry lieutenant about to deploy into a combat zone to lead an infantry platoon.
“Some thoughts:
- Hard work saves lives. Dig, camouflage, rehearse SOPs, study, plan, train between missions.
- Never be surprised. ... OP/LPs ... 3-man point team ... OPSEC ... do aerial recon ... be quiet on the battlefield.
- Safety, safety, safety ... getting soldiers killed or maimed by accident is very painful.
- In contact either shoot, flank and attack, or shoot and withdraw. Always shoot ... get volume fire quickly on the enemy. Practice actions on contact before every mission.
- The most important weapon on the battlefield is arty/mortars ... be prepared to put HE and smoke on possible enemy locations within three minutes. We rarely know where the fire is actually coming from ... arty will let you move without casualties on the battlefield.”[1]
As a signal doctrine writer, you’ve got to understand that McCaffrey’s words apply to the signal officer just as much as they do to the young infantry lieutenant. For the signal officer, at whatever tactical echelon, must configure his communications assets in such a way that all lieutenants can execute in accordance with the general’s guidance. General McCaffrey is directing an infantry combat leader. The signal officer is enabling that same combat leader. If the field manual doesn’t capture that dynamic, it fails as a doctrinal publication.
Or, take this example. You are writing about signal support to operations at brigade level. You might chose a Stryker brigade combat team to illustrate this. A Stryker brigade has “more than 3500 Soldiers ... and almost 2000 vehicles, including more than 300 Strykers.”
[2] In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (Stryker)—also known as the “Arrowhead Brigade,” was comprised of …
“the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry; 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry; 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry; 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry; 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery; 296th Brigade Support Battalion; 334th Signal Company; 209th Military Intelligence Company; 13th Engineer Company; and Company C, 52nd Infantry (Antitank). Attached to it for the Iraq deployment are the 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), flying OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, and the 1092nd Combat Engineer Company from the West Virginia Army National Guard."[3]
Obviously, the Stryker brigade is supported by its own organic signal company, in the Arrowhead’s case by the 334th Signal Company. As the doctrine writer, you have to realize that just to say that an SBCT draws its signal support from an organic signal company is insufficient. In fact, it’s practically a waste of time because everybody already knows that. The point you have to get across to your target audience is that that signal company, with support from higher echelons where necessary, is supporting combat operations. The signal officer of a Stryker brigade supports infantry, armored cavalry, field artillery, logistical support, intelligence, engineers, and aircraft. You have to be aware that a unit like this particular SBCT may be augmented with Reserve or National Guard forces that may not be equipped, communications-wise, like their Regular Army brethren—but who still have to be supported.
And think of signal support to large units like the 3rd Infantry Division which, during the “shock and awe phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, sprinted “720 kilometers in twenty-one days” while firing 610 direct support, ninety counter-fire, and twenty-six reinforcing artillery missions—13,923 155mm rounds and 794 multiple-launch rocket system missiles.
[4] Think of how often the division's command posts moved. Think of the factors of METT-TC. Sure, it’s a true statement to say that divisions have an organic signal support capability, normally in the form a division signal company. But if that’s all you can say about signal support to division operations, you haven’t learned yet what doctrine is all about.
Doctrine is “the blueprint for forces in combat.”
[5] It is the “fundamental principles by which the military forces, or elements thereof, guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”
[6]
Signal Soldiers are not just installing, operating, maintaining, and defending the Army’s portion of the network, they are supporting military operations—chief among them, combat.
_________________________________
[1] Barry R. McCaffrey, “Lessons in Leadership: E-mail Exchange Between The Bradley Professor and an Infantry Lieutenant,” Army Magazine, June 2005, 16.
[2] Dennis Steele, “The Stryker: Going Up North,” Army Magazine, March 2004, 44-54.
[4] Thomas G. Torrence, “The Division Artillery of the 3rd Infantry Division,” Army Magazine, April 2004, 57-60.
[5] Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), 253
[6] Joint Publication 1-02.
