From the start of the Civil War, disparities between
the North and South in terms of capabilities and resources gave the North a
sizeable advantage. Yet for about the
first two years of fighting that advantage had not yielded much. Though the scales had always been weighted in
favor of the North, in 1863 they began tipping more and more in that direction. There are several reasons for this.
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| President Lincoln visits his commanders in the field |
First, President Lincoln issued the second (final) Emancipation
Proclamation on January 1, 1863. The net
effect of this was increased black recruitment and the organization of black
regiments in the Union Army. Henceforth,
about nine percent of Union forces were black.[1] This represented a significant manpower drain
away from the Confederacy and to the Union.
Given the disparity in manpower strength at the beginning of the war,
this was a huge factor in tipping the scales more in favor of the North.
National conscription became necessary for both the
North and the South, and both sides instituted this practice, the South in 1862[2]
and the North on March 3, 1863[3]. Given the much larger manpower base from
which to draw on in the North, universal (compulsory) military service further
weighted the manpower advantage to the North.
As the war entered its third year, anti-war sentiment
in the North increased. This was a
political problem for President Lincoln who in 1863 began suppressing civil
liberties, including suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. These three things, the emancipation, national
conscription, and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus intensified Northern
opposition to the war, but when Congress in March of 1863 passed the Habeas
Corpus Act,[4]
it strengthened the president’s hand and sapped much of the strength of the
anti-war movement. This drag upon the
North’s war-making ability removed, the president was freed to prosecute the
war even more vigorously.
Tactical success, first at Vicksburg,[5]
then at Gettysburg[6]
and soon after at Charleston[7]
increased the North’s strategic advantage.
Victory in these battles gave Union forces the upper hand in both the
western and eastern theaters of was, and upon the sea. It also set the conditions for the slow but
inevitable strangulation of the South.
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| Lt. Gen. U. S. Grant |
After securing Vicksburg, Lincoln reorganized the
Union Army’s command structure, putting Grant in charge of all forces (except
for Banks’ army).[8] On March 9, 1864, Grant was promoted to Lieutenant
General, a rank not held since George Washington.[9] In Grant, Lincoln finally found a general who
would execute his strategy and who would push his (the North’s) advantages on
the field against Southern commanders.
Finally, the presidential election of 1864, removed
the last of Southern hopes that a prolonged war would sap the North’s will to
fight. The election itself became a “referendum
on the war.”[10] Lincoln’s reelection was presaged—and made
possible—by three significant tactical situations that fell, like dominoes, in
the North’s favor. These were Farragut’s
victory at Mobile Bay, cutting off the South’s last outlet to supply via the
sea; Sherman’s capture of Atlanta—a tremendous logistical as well as
psychological blow; and Sheridan’s defeat of Jubal Early’s forces in a series
of battles in the Shenandoah Valley, severely damaging Lee’s supply lines.[11]
Each of these events by itself added to the North’s
already insurmountable advantage. All of
them together, coming as they did like a torrent as the war moved into its
third and fourth years, snapped the Southern population’s will to resist,
lopped off sizeable portions of the Confederate army’s manpower, and cut off
virtually all of its last remaining sources of supply. These events not only altered the course of
the war, primarily in terms of hastening its end, but they also shaped its
conclusion. There was no truce or cease
fire. These events forced upon the South
unconditional surrender.
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