Doctrine
The blueprint for forces in combat.[1]
Fundamental
principles by
which the military forces, or elements thereof, guide their actions in support
of national objectives. It is
authoritative but requires judgment in application.[2]
It is the “fundamental
principles by which the [operational
Army] and elements of the generating force that directly support operations
guide their actions in support of national objectives.[3] [Emphasis mine].
“The principles that shape military operations are based on centuries of experience and institutional refinement and are used almost universally. When codified and applied in training and wartime operations, such principles are called doctrine. Doctrine (principles) usually applies to operations (by specifying how to conduct campaigns and extended battles) and to tactics (how to conduct a single engagement or series of similar engagements), but not to strategy. “Strategic doctrine” is an oxymoron since strategy is defined by contingent war aims.”[4]
Principle—a comprehensive and fundamental law, doctrine, or assumption.[5] The 12 principles
of war [objective; offensive; mass; economy of force; maneuver; unity of
command; security; surprise; simplicity; restraint; perseverance; legitimacy] are
defined in JP 3-0, Appx A.
Principles illustrated
“George C. Marshall, whose
1941 war manual served as a model for the 1982 [FM 100-5 Operations], had
warned that mobile combat was ‘a cloud of uncertainties, haste, rapid
movements, congestion on the roads, strange terrain, lack of ammunition and
supplies at the right places at the right moment, failures of communication,
terrific tests of endurance, and misunderstandings in direct proportion to the
inexperience of the officers.’”[6] Consistent with the Joint definition of
doctrine, General Marshall, in that war manual of his, just listed nine
fundamental principles of mobile warfare.
“Tactical doctrine—institutionally recommended ways of fighting used
to train individuals and units before they enter combat.”[7]
“A
military organization’s doctrine spells out the conceptual framework that determines how the organization will
fight.”[8]
Under the Army’s Doctrine
2015 concept, doctrine is defined as
the fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide
their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in
application. Army doctrine includes not
only principles, but also tactics and procedures. Field
manuals are defined as a Department of the Army publication that contains
principles, tactics, procedures, and other doctrinal information. It describes how the Army and its organizations conduct and train for those
operations. [9]
"Effective doctrine is current, relevant, well-researched, flexible,
understandable, consistent, concise, enduring, and timely … a system of
thought.” [10]
“Army doctrine is a systematic body of thought describing how Army forces intend to operate
as a member of the joint force in the
present and near term, with current force structure and materiel.” Doctrine “describes how … to think … and what
to train.”[11]
If doctrine represents how the Army intends to fight, and history is a
record of how its operations were actually conducted, then, for better or
worse, history and doctrine are practically mirror images of each other.
“Write with an understanding of the current
fight, but remember, doctrine is not just about today, it’s about posturing us intellectually as a profession
for the next fight.” [12]
“Joint doctrine promotes a common
perspective from which to plan,
train, and conduct military operations.
It represents what is taught,
believed, and advocated as what is right.”[13]
“One of the most persistent trends is the lack of
signal corps officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and Soldiers who
understand their duties and responsibilities. Let’s face it; we as signaleers do not have an established
and written doctrine to follow like the infantry or field artillery.” [14]
Perennial
problem: the Army’s implicit or tacit expert knowledge … gained by
[Soldiers] in the field [and] in the classroom, is [normally] well ahead of its
explicit expert knowledge, which is recorded in doctrine.[15]
Doctrine
and Lessons Learned
Early in World War II, the British army’s
“most serious problem was failing to develop a coherent combined-arms doctrine based on a thorough study of the last war.”[16]
On the other hand, the Germans developed Leadership and Battle with Combined Arms
(1923)—the 1933 version of which became Truppenfuehrung—written
by Generals [!] Werner von Fritsch and Ludwig Beck [which] provided
[their] doctrine for the coming war.”[17]
General Hans von Seeckt, commander of the
German army in the interwar years, on
lessons learned: “It is absolutely
necessary to put the experience of the war in a broad light and collect this
experience while the impressions won on
the battlefield are still fresh and a major portion of the experienced officers
are still in leading positions.” [18]
U.S. General John J. “Black Jack” Pershing
performed such an analysis which “culminated in the Field Service Regulation of 1923, the army’s basic doctrinal manual [The ADP/ADRP 3-0 of that day], which
explains why the U.S. was able to adapt so quickly to the tactical conditions
of combat in World War II.”[19]
General
William DePuy “personally wrote [!] much of the 1976 version of FM 100-5.”[20]
“The
rule of officer training [the same
could be said about doctrine] is to reduce the conduct of war to a set of rules
and a system of procedures—and thereby to make orderly and rational what is
essentially chaotic and instinctive.”[21]
“…extended
range of procedures which have as
their object the assimilation of almost all of an officer’s professional
activities to a corporate standard and common form.”[22]
“ …
instantly recognizable and universally comprehensible vocabulary.”[23]
“ …
formalized … ‘observations’, ‘conclusions’, and ‘intentions’.[24]
“ … he [the young officer] learns ‘rights’ and ‘wrongs’ … by reference to simplified manuals …”[25]
The
purpose of [doctrine] is to equip the young officer with the ability “to organize
his intake of sensations [in battle], to reduce the events of combat to as few and
as easily recognizable a set of elements as possible …”[26]
[1] Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The
Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1993), 252.
[2] JP 1-02.
[3] TR 25-36, Final Draft, 8 July 2011, para. 3-3a(1).
[4] Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to Be
Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, MA: 2000), 586.
[5] Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary, 10th Ed.
[6] Rick Atkinson, 253.
[7] Murray and Millet, 589.
[9] ATZL-MCK-D memo, Subj: Review
of TRADOC Regulation 25-36, The TRADOC
Doctrinal Literature Program, dated 31 October 2011.
[10] TR 25-36.
[11] TR 25-36, Final Draft, 8
July 2011.
[12] General Robert W. Cone,
Commander, U.S. Army TRADOC Memorandum, subject: Doctrine 2015 Guidance, dated 23 August 2011.
[13] JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed
Forces of the United States. I am of a mind that we should not
distinguish between ‘joint’ and ‘service’ doctrine. Doctrine is doctrine; if it is a fundamental principle,
it is doctrine, no matter who writes it.
[14] JRTC Signal
Newsletter, Vol. IV (12-04), 9.
[15] Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Transforming the Army’s Way of Battle:
Revising Our Abstract Knowledge,” The Future of the Army Profession, 2d
Ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill), 374.
[16] Murray and Millet, 24.
[17] Murray and Millet, 22.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Murray and Millet, 28.
[20] Robert Scales, Jr., “Certain
Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington: Brassey’s), 13.
[21] John Keegan, The Face of
Battle (New York: Viking Press, 1976), 20.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid., 20-21.
[24] Ibid., 21
[25] Ibid., 21
[26] Or officer training, Ibid., 22.
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